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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION 
The Long-Term Costs of Caring: 
How Caring for an Aging Parent Impacts Wealth Trajectories of Caregivers 
 
by 
Jennifer Crane Greenfield 
Doctor of Philosophy in Social Work 
Washington University in St. Louis, 2013 
Professor Nancy Morrow-Howell, Chair 
 
Long-term care in the U.S. is a growing concern as our aging population exerts pressure 
on formal and informal care systems. Public expenditures on formal care are increasing rapidly, 
even as reliance on informal caregivers expands. Recent policy innovations are shifting Medicaid 
and Medicare funding toward home- and community-based services (HCBS) as an alternative to 
nursing home care. This may help reduce overall LTC care costs to states and the federal 
government, but it also shifts more responsibility to families and informal care networks. Not 
only can caregiving have negative impacts on the physical and mental health of caregivers, but it 
also can be expensive, both in terms of direct costs and in terms of lost wages and work 
opportunities. However, to date, these financial consequences are not fully understood.  
This project uses longitudinal, nationally representative data from six waves of the Health 
and Retirement Study (1998-2008) to evaluate whether caring for aging parents impacts 
caregivers’ assets over time. Latent trajectory analysis was used to identify groups for whom 
caregiving had a negative impact on wealth trajectories. A four-group model fit best and revealed 
one group, with 4.3% of respondents, for whom caregiving had a significant, negative 
relationship. Further, race, education, and caregivers’ health were significantly related to these 
 x
trajectories. Gender and marital status were not related. Lastly, among caregivers, care duration 
did not significantly impact asset trajectories, and care intensity had mixed effects.   
Findings indicate that caring for an aging parent has a significant, negative impact for 
some adults over age 50, but only for a small group. Importantly, those who are negatively 
impacted are more likely to be in already vulnerable groups. As reliance on informal caregiving 
increases, special attention should be paid to those caregivers who may be particularly vulnerable 
to the financial impacts of caregiving; better assessments and more economic supports are 
needed to offset the potential exacerbating impacts of caregiving.
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Introduction 
Termed “The Forgotten Catastrophe” by U. S. Representative Henry Waxman in 1990, 
long-term care (LTC) financing remains a pressing health policy issue in the United States today 
– and yet, although the crisis has long been anticipated, it has been poorly prepared for. Twenty-
three years ago, the U.S. Bipartisan Commission on Comprehensive Health Care (a 
Congressional task force also known as the “Pepper Commission”) concluded that the nation was 
in urgent need of long-term care reform and that reform was in reach. Senator Rockefeller, chair 
of the Commission, wrote that reform faced a “clear field” for passage in Congress because such 
a program would be popular with the American electorate, most of whom, he said, “see 
themselves at risk of impoverishment if they or their family members need long-term care” 
(Rockefeller, 1990). His rosy prediction of clear and easy passage proved to be too optimistic, 
however, and 23 years later, significant reform has yet to be implemented.  
Nonetheless, the crisis remains a popular topic for both health policy experts and the 
mainstream media, and the fear of impoverishment remains pervasive and very real for many 
families. Recent headlines, such as, “Live Long and Pay for It: America’s Real Long-Term Cost 
Crisis” (Galston, 2012) and, “The Crisis in Long-term Care” (NYT, 2011), underline this fear. In 
fact, the U.S. has experienced a confluence of factors leading to unsustainable growth in long-
term care costs. Changing demographics of the population, particularly with the aging of the 
Baby Boomer generation, have led to historically large numbers of people reaching age 65. As 
health care treatments have improved, longevity has increased so that those who reach age 65 
can now expect to live nearly 20 more years (CDC, 2012). At the same time, 44% of older adults 
live with multiple chronic conditions, and the risk of chronic illness increases dramatically with 
age (Freudenberg & Olden, 2011). A few chronic illnesses in particular, such as Alzheimer’s 
 2
disease, are associated with very high treatment costs because of the length of time care is 
needed and the intensity of that care, and unfortunately, the incidence of these diseases is 
increasing. There is nearly a 50% chance that a person will develop Alzheimer’s disease or a 
related dementia by the time he or she is 85 (Hebert, Scherr, Bienias, Bennett, & Evans, 2003), 
and as the population ages, growing numbers of people are at risk for this emotionally and 
financially challenging disease. Meanwhile, rising health care costs – driven in part by 
innovations in technology and pharmaceuticals – have caused the per-person cost of these 
services to rise much more quickly than inflation. Combined, these factors create a situation in 
which both public programs and individual budgets are strained to the breaking point. Families 
already experience impoverishment with increasing speed as healthcare costs rise – a fact 
demonstrated by the growing percentage of LTC services paid for by Medicaid, which requires 
complete impoverishment of the care recipient as a condition of coverage (Komisar & 
Thompson, 2007; Shirey & Komisar, 2003). Simultaneously, this rise in dependence on 
Medicaid is straining state budgets. Thus, although LTC is most often discussed in health policy 
terms, it is increasingly clear that our longevity has become an economic liability.  
Despite growing a growing sense of urgency about the issue, solutions have been elusive. 
Comprehensive policy innovation – of the scale described in the Pepper Commission report – is 
still needed, and yet recent attempts to develop major new programs, such as the Community 
Living Assistance Services and Supports (CLASS) Act, have failed. Some incremental changes 
have been implemented, mostly in the form of Medicaid waivers and demonstration project 
grants for payment system and care delivery reforms. However, these innovations are aimed 
largely at reducing federal and state burdens without addressing the costs to individual patients 
and caregivers. Without comprehensive approaches to financing long-term services and supports 
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(LTSS) for those with chronic care needs, the financial health of families is at risk, and this risk 
is growing. A large body of work has documented that economic security is associated with 
better health, mental health, increased civic participation, and other measures of wellbeing (see 
Braveman, Egerter, Williams, 2011, for a review of this literature). Currently, however, most 
public LTC payment streams do not protect assets, and in fact, they often require individuals to 
spend down assets almost entirely in order to fund LTC services. 
The research hypotheses that are the focus of this dissertation grew from a larger set of 
questions about the impacts of our current LTC coverage system on the financial health of 
families: if individuals must become impoverished in order to qualify for Medicaid – and if 
many individuals who receive LTSS eventually do qualify for Medicaid – are there indirect 
economic effects for the families of care recipients? Further, when individuals do not end up 
requiring Medicaid coverage, but rely instead on the care provided by family members, are there 
economic effects for those who provide that care? And if so, are the consequences significant 
enough that the structure of our LTC system, which relies primarily on informal care and means-
tested Medicaid financing, increases long-term financial vulnerability among families of care 
recipients by decreasing those families' ability to save for their own retirement and future LTC 
needs?  
In the following chapters, therefore, I describe the scope of the long-term care problem – 
who receives care, who provides it, and what the costs of this care are for society and families – 
and review what is known about the economic impacts of informal care. Then I present analysis 
of three research questions that are motivated by the desire to understand the economic impacts 
of providing care for an aging family member. The findings from this analysis, and the 
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implications for social work practice and for future policy development, are discussed in the final 
chapters.  
To provide some context for this analysis and discussion, a few definitions will be 
helpful: 
1. What is long-term care (LTC)? Though seemingly straightforward, answering this 
question is complicated. A conservative definition of LTC is assistance with 
completion of “the basic tasks of everyday life, such as eating, bathing, dressing, 
toileting, and transferring," (Weiner, Hanley, Clark, and Van Nostrand, 1990; see also 
Katz, Ford, Moskowitz, Jackson, & Jaffe, 1963). Broader definitions include 
assistance with instrumental activities of daily living, which include other important 
functions such as banking, cooking, and housekeeping (AHRQ, 2010; Lawton & 
Brody, 1969). The choice of definition can have significant implications for 
individuals seeking care, since some insurance plans and public programs only 
recognize the need for assistance with ADLs as a qualification for receiving coverage 
for this care; as a result, when individuals find that their ability to manage finances, 
cook, and manage their medications is diminished, they may be forced to rely on 
family members or friends for assistance, or to pay out-of-pocket for the help they 
need. Further, many plans only cover assistance when individuals need assistance 
with at least two ADLs, and so individuals who need help with just one are also left to 
find care elsewhere.  
2. What are long-term services and supports (LTSS)? LTSS are the specific activities 
and programs that comprise LTC; they include direct-care tasks such as bathing, 
grooming, and feeding, as well as personal assistance such as running errands, 
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providing transportation, and managing medications. LTSS can also include 
assistance that provides more general support, such as coordinating care for the care 
recipient, scheduling appointments, and training caregivers.  
3. What is caregiving? For the purposes of this dissertation, caregiving refers to the 
provision of care to someone requiring LTC. Caregivers may be paid professionals 
(i.e. social workers and nurses) or paraprofessionals (such as home care aides and 
personal care assistants); they may also be family members or friends who have no 
prior professional training as caregivers. 
4. What is formal care? Formal care is the type of care provided by professionals and 
paraprofessionals, and it is generally paid for – through insurance plans, public 
programs, or by the care recipient and his or her family. Formal care may be provided 
in a number of settings, including nursing homes (also known as skilled nursing 
facilities or SNFs), assisted living facilities, or the individual's home.  
5. What is informal care? For the purposes of this dissertation, informal care is the term 
that will be used to describe any type of care that is not provided by a paid 
professional or paraprofessional. In some discussions of caregiving, the terms "unpaid 
care" or "family care" are used. These can be misleading, however, because in some 
areas, nonprofessional caregivers may be compensated through programs such as 
"Cash and Counseling" (which is described in Chapter One); although the 
compensation is rarely equivalent to that received by formal care providers, using a 
term such as unpaid care may inadvertently exclude the informal caregivers who 
benefit from these types of programs. Likewise, using the term "family caregiving" 
may exclude the care provided by friends and neighbors, who are sometimes the sole 
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source of care for those in need of assistance. In fact, some retirement communities 
are designed with this kind of neighboring in mind – and it may be that, in 
communities where financial resources and access to formal care services are scarce, 
the assistance provided by friends and neighbors is vital, and that it is 
underrepresented in surveys that limit definitions of caregiving to the care provided 
by family members. A final note about informal care is that it is not mutually 
exclusive with formal care; that is, when a care recipient is receiving formal care 
services in the home or in a nursing home, she or he may also benefit from informal 
care. As a result, the number of hours of care received by an individual may add up to 
more than 24 hours a day. 
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Chapter 1: Scope of the LTC Problem 
Who receives care?  
Numbers. Given how varied the definitions of LTC are, it should come as no surprise 
that estimates of how many Americans require LTC vary as well. The Centers for Medicare and 
Medicaid Services (CMS) have estimated that nearly 15 million adults over age 18 receive LTC; 
of these, nine million are adults aged 65 and above, which is approximately 20% of the U.S. 
older adult population (CMS, 2012a). An additional 6 million adults below age 65 also receive 
care. These estimates are somewhat higher than those derived by Kaye, Harrington, and LaPlante 
(2010), who analyzed data from three nationally representative surveys to identify the number of 
people who need LTC. In their study, estimates of those needing LTC ranged from 10 to 12 
million Americans, with roughly half of these belonging to the 65 and older population. Both of 
these estimates use the more restrictive “ADL-only” definition of LTC, however, and it is 
reasonable to assume that some people receive help with IADLs only, and are therefore not 
included in this count. Though the numbers vary somewhat, it is likely that roughly 4-5% of the 
American population requires some form of LTC currently (KFF, 2012). Further, while LTC is 
often thought of as an “older adult problem,” LTC affects millions of people at earlier stages of 
the life course.  
Demographics. LTC is an issue that reaches across socio-economic strata and other 
subdivisions within the U.S. population. At the same time, certain differences are important to 
note. A vast majority of LTC recipients live in the community: of the 10-15 million LTC 
recipients, only 1.4 to 1.8 million live in an institutional setting (such as a nursing home), while 
the rest live either alone or with family. Among those residing in nursing homes, more than 80% 
are above age 65, and the average age is 82 (Kaye, Harrington, & LaPlante, 2010). Meanwhile, 
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community-dwelling LTC recipients tend to be younger: only 45% are over the age of 65, and 
the average age is near 60. Women are more likely to be LTC recipients – most likely because 
women have longer life expectancy than men – and they are much more likely to live in nursing 
homes; in fact, almost two-thirds of nursing home residents are female.  
Among the LTC recipients who receive care in their own home, 74% live in the home 
with spouses or other family members, and half of them have household income of less than 
200% of the federal poverty limit (FPL), with a median household income of only $32,000 
(Kaye, Harrington, & LaPlante, 2010). We know that 14 million people receive Medicaid-funded 
LTSS, which means that they have very low income and virtually no assets, or that they have 
spent-down their assets to nearly nothing (KFF, 2012b). However, not as much is known about 
how the income and assets of the families of Medicaid recipients differ from those of non-
Medicaid LTC recipients. Still, even among the broad population of those aged 65 and over, the 
median household income was only $31,157 in 2009, and the median net worth was $170,494; 
further, 11% have incomes below FPL, and 8% have zero or negative net household wealth 
(Frye, Cohn, Livingston, & Taylor, 2011). Poverty among older adults, even with the supports 
available through Social Security, remains an important concern, and it is reasonable to expect 
that those who require LTC are even more vulnerable. 
Data on racial and ethnic differences among LTC recipients is limited, but some evidence 
suggests that distribution of LTC recipients by race roughly mirrors the racial distributions of the 
population in general (Spector, Fleishman, Pezzin, & Spillman, 2000; Feng, Fennell, Tyler, 
Clark, & Mor, 2011). Interestingly, Feng, et al. (2011), assert that while growth in African-
American and Latino populations in nursing homes is rising dramatically and consistently with 
growth in the overall population of adults aged 65 and older, the percentage of White nursing 
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home residents is actually dropping. This suggests that some disparities may exist in access to 
more preferred venues of care, such as home- and community-based care, with Whites having 
more choices than their African-American and Latino counterparts. Numbers derived by Kaye, 
Harrington, and LaPlante (2010) paint a slightly different picture. They find that the racial/ethnic 
distribution among LTC recipients differs slightly from the population at large, with minority 
representation slightly higher among LTC recipients. For instance, among those living in care 
facilities, Whites account for 82% of LTC recipients, African-Americans, 14%, and Latinos, 5%. 
Meanwhile, among community-dwelling LTC recipients, Latinos constitute 10% of the 
population, while 16% are African-American and 76% are White. The percentages of 
Asian/Pacific Islander and Native American LTC recipients in institutional care are lower than 
percentages of those living in the community (1.5% vs. 3%, and 1% vs. 2%, respectively). It may 
be that findings from Kaye, Harrington & LaPlante are not inconsistent with Feng, et al., since 
the latter study focuses on change statistics and seeks to identify an emerging trend. Further 
research is needed to understand the degree to which disparities exist in access to the preferred 
modes of LTC delivery, and to examine the degree to which pressure to provide informal care 
exacerbates existing vulnerabilities with regard to health and family financial security. 
 
Who provides care?  
Numbers. Among those living in the community, 92% of care recipients receive at least 
some help with activities of daily living (ADLs) from an unpaid helper such as a spouse, child, 
or friend, and at least 62% receive help only from informal caregivers. Like data on care 
recipients, estimates of the prevalence of caregiving vary. The Agency for Healthcare Research 
and Quality (AHRQ, 2010) estimates that 45 million Americans, or 15% of the population, are 
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involved in providing care for a disabled adult, while a recent study by NAC and AARP (2009) 
puts the number closer to 62 million. According to the most recent estimates by the MetLife 
Mature Market Institute (MMI, 2012), 10 million adults over age 50 care for a parent.  
Demographics. As mentioned previously, informal caregivers are usually not 
compensated for providing care. Nearly half work full-time while also fulfilling caregiving 
responsibilities at home, and another 11% work part-time (NAC & AARP, 2009). Almost half 
(48%) of these caregivers are over the age of 50, with just 13% over the age of 65. As a result, 
the average age of caregivers is approximately 49, but this has been increasing gradually over 
time; the average age was 46 in 2004. Approximately 70% of caregivers are White, and roughly 
13% are African-American. More than 42% of caregivers report household income of less than 
$50,000 per year, and the median household income is approximately $57,000. Fifty-eight 
percent of caregivers are married, and 37% have children or grandchildren living in their 
households; close to one-third (31%) also live with their care recipient. Most caregivers (66%) 
are women. Nearly one-third (31%) of caregivers have provided care for more than 5 years, and 
this number has increased in recent years. Clearly, LTC is not just an issue for the individuals 
receiving care, but also has ripple effects across families and communities across the United 
States. 
Formal Care. As noted previously, informal caregivers are not the only people involved 
in providing care. Formal, direct care services are a vast and growing industry, which employs 
three million people nationwide (PHI, 2011). These workers help clients with both ADLs and 
IADLs, and provide companionship in some cases, especially for those who are unable to leave 
their homes, or for those who have moderate to advanced dementia and are not able to be left 
unattended for safety reasons. More than half of direct care workers (1.7 million) work in home 
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and community settings, and most are employed by for-profit agencies, while about 12% are 
either self-employed or employed by private households (DOL, 2012). The average homecare 
worker earns $17,000 per year, while nursing aides and home health care workers earning 
slightly more ($18,300), and personal aides earn much less ($13,000) (PHI, 2012).  As a result, 
47% of direct care workers rely on public benefits such as food stamps or Medicaid to 
supplement their incomes. Importantly, a disproportionate share of direct care workers are from 
minority populations: only 47% are White, while 30% are African-American and 16% are 
Latino. The average age of these workers is 42, but those who are self-employed or employed by 
private homes tend to be somewhat older at 48 years old, while those employed in nursing homes 
are slightly younger (40 years) on average. In other words, workers are often members of 
vulnerable groups, and, earning below-average wages in mid-life, are more vulnerable to 
economic insecurity in later life than the general population. Although analysis of the economic 
impacts of caregiving on these workers is not included in the present study, this is an important 
area for future research and policy development. 
 
What does LTC cost and who pays?  
In 2009, $240 billion was spent nationwide on formal long-term care services, with 
roughly 69% of this cost paid for by public programs such as Medicare and Medicaid (KFF, 
2012). Most of the rest of the cost (19%) was borne by families, while only 7% was paid for by 
private insurance. Since the average cost of a nursing home stay in 2010 was $88,000 – with 
costs exceeding $100,000 in one-fifth of states – the burden on families can be quite substantial 
when neither private nor public sources of coverage are available. Nonetheless, fewer than 11% 
of Americans aged 55 and older, and less than 10% of the population as a whole, have private 
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long-term care insurance to help pay for this care (Johnson & Park, 2011). The rest rely on 
personal savings and public programs, meaning that for the majority of Americans, a lifetime’s 
worth of savings may be lost if long-term care is needed. The following is a brief overview of the 
primary payment mechanisms for formal LTC. This context is important for understanding how 
the financial risk that grows with our increasing longevity is distributed across taxpayers in 
general, care recipients, and caregivers.  
Private insurance. Although a very small percentage of LTC costs are paid by insurance 
plans, the presence of this source of coverage is important to note. Private LTC insurance 
products are available, but uptake of these products has been minimal; fewer than 10% of 
Americans are covered by a private LTC insurance plan and this level is decreasing (Andrews, 
2010). This low uptake, combined with higher than expected inflation in health care costs and 
lower than anticipated interest rates, has led many insurance companies to drop their LTCI 
products (Schoeff, 2012). Ultimately, only about 7% of LTC expenses are paid for through 
private insurance (Kaiser Family Foundation, 2012), and this number is expected to decrease 
unless new market reforms are implemented.  
The failure of the private LTCI market to thrive means that pressure on both individual 
budgets and public programs is growing. In fact, some speculate that the presence of Medicaid – 
which acts as the payor of last resort when private funds have been expended fully – serves to 
deter many families from purchasing costly private insurance products (Brown & Finkelstein, 
2011). Evidence that purchase rates of LTCI increase as family assets increase is used to support 
this theory, because wealthier families have greater incentive to preserve their assets rather than 
risking asset spend-down through Medicaid. An alternative view is that families with fewer 
assets have more difficulty paying insurance premiums, which can range from $1,100 for a plan 
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purchased by a middle-aged adult with minimal benefits to over $16,000 per year for older 
individuals with more robust benefits. Debate continues about whether private insurance is 
untenable – meaning an expanded public insurance system is needed – or if the presence of any 
public safety net prevents the private market from succeeding. Either way, the net result has been 
an increasing dependence on public programs to pay for formal care.  
Medicaid. Total Medicaid expenditures alone reached $429 billion last year, and 
although only 6% of Medicaid enrollees (4 million people) use Medicaid-funded LTSS, they 
account for roughly half of all Medicaid expenditures (KFF, 2012). The state share of this 
spending was $156 million in 2011, or approximately 23.6% of all state spending. For some 
states, Medicaid accounts for an even larger share of spending; Pennsylvania, for instance, spent 
nearly $8 billion, or 31% of the state budget, with another $14 billion spent in the state through 
federal matching funds (NASBO, 2011). Since most long-term care recipients are members of 
“mandatory populations” or require “mandatory services” as defined by federal law, the only 
recourse for states seeking to save money is to change the way that services are delivered (such 
as prioritizing home care over nursing home stays), or to drop coverage for other, non-mandatory 
populations. (For this reason, coverage for non-disabled adults under age 65 has virtually 
disappeared in many states.)  
At the same time, a dramatic shift toward home- and community-based long-term care 
services is also underway. This shift has been partly driven by the need for states to save money 
– providing care in the home is widely perceived to be less expensive than providing care in 
nursing homes, although the evidence is mixed – but was also prompted in part in 1999 by a 
ruling of the Olmstead v. L. C. and E. W. ruling of the U. S. Supreme Court.  The Court found 
that requiring LTC recipients to move into a nursing home to receive care was a violation of their 
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right to receive services in the community when medically appropriate (Department of Justice, 
2012). This Olmstead decision prompted a rewriting of Medicaid policy to allow states to apply 
for waivers through which they could begin to provide care in non-institutional settings. A 
revolution in "consumer-directed services" has ensued, with a proliferation of waivers in most 
states and the resulting development of several program innovations that support not just care 
recipients, but also their informal caregivers. In 2009, this shift was codified in the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA or ACA; Public Law 111-148), which specifies a 
goal to “rebalance” Medicaid services “by expanding access to an array of home- and 
community-based services and reducing dependence on institutional care” (CMS, 2012).  Several 
policy innovations are funded through the ACA to help states move toward this goal. For 
instance, the ACA institutes a major expansion of the “Cash and Counseling” model of care 
delivery, allowing Medicaid beneficiaries to receive cash benefits that they can use to purchase 
services, medical equipment, and home modifications or other needed products and services at 
their discretion. The ACA also includes an expansion of the “Money Follows the Person” 
program, which allows Medicaid dollars to be used to transition nursing home residents back 
into the community to receive care in their own homes or another community-based setting. Both 
of these programs give LTC consumers more discretion to determine what types of care they 
want to receive, who will deliver it, and where the care will be delivered. An important 
component is that care recipients often have the option to use funds to pay family members or 
friends to provide care, and to spend funds on home modifications that will facilitate 
independence.  
Though these programs have potential to satisfy clients’ desire to remain at home and 
independent for as long as possible, there are a number of systemic challenges that limit the 
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effectiveness of these programs. First, a recent study of the Money Follows the Person program 
found that workforce shortages have proved to be a major barrier to connecting clients with 
HCBS (Watts, 2011). There are a number of reasons that this workforce has not responded to 
increasing demand. Certified nursing assistants and home health aides cite poor pay, lack of 
benefits, insufficient training and too few opportunities for advancement as the major reasons for 
job dissatisfaction, which indicates that major labor market reforms would be needed to make the 
shift to HCBS more wide-spread (Khatutsky, Weiner, Anderson, Ahkmerova, Jessup & 
Squillace, 2011).  
Second, when clients choose to use funds to pay family members as caregivers, 
significant training is needed but is not always available. Furthermore, payments are not always 
enough to offset caregivers’ lost wages and other expenses related to caregiving, and do not 
compensate caregivers for all the hours of care they provide. A study of Cash and Counseling 
programs in three states, Arkansas, Florida, and New Jersey, found that caregivers were 
compensated, on average, for fewer than half the hours of care they provided (Dale, Brown, 
Phillips, & Carlson, 2005). Their compensation ranged from $6/hour in Arkansas to just over 
$10/hour in Florida, but compensation for travel time and fringe benefits, like health insurance, 
were rarely provided. Further, in nearly a third of cases, payments were sometimes late, which 
means that they cannot be relied upon as a main source of income. These findings make it clear 
that while these programs do provide a small stipend to facilitate caregiving by family members 
or friends, the cash supports may not be enough to protect caregivers from the financial 
consequences associated with intensive caregiving responsibilities. 
A third challenge related to these rebalancing efforts is that the programs are sometimes 
time-limited. In particular, Money Follows the Person allows for 12 months of transitional 
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services, at which point covered services revert to the regular package of Medicaid LTSS 
provided by the state. This often means that while some initial funding is spent on training 
informal caregivers and assisting with the transition back into the home, these supports 
disappear, leaving informal caregivers to assume the majority of responsibility for providing 
care. For this reason, states are seeing a growth in the number of participants who are readmitted 
to institutional care after their transitional period is over (KFF, 2011). There may also be adverse 
consequences for caregivers when the care recipient remains in the community and the 
transitional services end. Without sustained efforts to support caregivers, programs that prioritize 
HCBS may leave families exposed to risks of financial, physical, and emotional strain. Thus, 
although Medicaid bears the lion's share of the financial burden for LTC and states face dire 
financial crises that spur them to seek ways to reduce LTC spending, these Medicaid innovations 
may be exacerbating, not easing, problems faced by caregivers. 
Medicare. Until very recently, Medicare has played a minor role in financing long-term 
care relative to the role of Medicaid. Although most Americans believe that Medicare will pay 
for their long-term care needs, the law is written in such a way that it only pays for care that 1) 
follows a hospitalization and 2) is reasonably expected to result in improved functioning. As a 
result, Medicare only pays for about 24% of LTC costs, or slightly more than is paid by 
individuals out-of-pocket (KFF, 2012). This amounted to $58 billion in 2009 – no small sum, but 
not nearly the price paid through the means-tested Medicaid program. However, this number 
may rise dramatically in the near future.  
The rule that Medicare could only pay for LTSS that were expected to result in improved 
functioning was recently challenged in a class action lawsuit, Jimmo v. Sebelius, which was 
settled out of court by Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) in October 2012 
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(Miller, 2012). As a result of this settlement, for three years, Medicare will be required to expand 
its LTC eligibility criteria to include all skilled care (such as nursing or physical therapy) 
resulting from a hospitalization, even if it is not expected to result in increased functioning or 
cure. This settlement has the potential to radically alter the distribution of LTC financing, since 
many people who do not qualify for Medicaid may be eligible for Medicare-financed LTSS. As a 
result, care recipients' out-of-pocket costs may decrease, while the share of LTC paid for by the 
public will increase by an unknown amount. As of this writing, the settlement has not been 
finalized in court, and so impacts of the ruling have not yet been assessed. Additionally, it is 
unknown whether this policy change will only last the three years mandated by the settlement or 
if, once implemented, this change will become the new status quo. 
Care recipients and their caregivers. The cost of formal care, to both families and 
society, is only part of the picture. The value of care provided by families, which is mostly 
unpaid, was estimated to be roughly $450 billion in 2010, and this figure increases dramatically 
each year (Feinberg, Reinhard, Houser, & Choula, 2011). This in-kind donation of time is 
important to recognize, in part because it represents an opportunity cost: time spent on 
caregiving is time that might otherwise be spent on other activities, including paid work, other 
volunteering, or leisure. As an opportunity cost, therefore, caregiving – even when separated 
from the loss in productivity that may result from caregiving's health effects – can be seen as a 
drain on the country's GDP. Traditionally, the value of informal care has been calculated using 
the going rate for formal care, not by estimating the opportunity costs. As a result, the actual 
impact of informal caregiving on GDP is unknown. 
On top of their donations of time, families also incur direct financial expenses when 
meeting the care needs of family members, friends, and neighbors. Though estimates of out-of-
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pocket expenses for caregiving vary widely, one recent study estimated the average annual 
expenses for each caregiver to be between $5,531 and $12,300 (Evercare/NAC, 2007). As 
discussed below, the sample used to derive this estimate is not nationally representative, and it is 
not known how many families experience this kind of financial drain; some may pay 
significantly more, if the care recipient has no assets but is not receiving Medicaid, while others 
may not spend any of their own money on care. However, if even the lower estimate by 
Evercare/NAC is accurate and generalizable, with nearly 45 million people providing care for a 
disabled adult over the age of 17, as much as $555 billion may be spent privately – on both 
formal care and indirect expenses such as legal services, out-of-pocket health expenses, and 
home modification such as ramps and bathroom grab bars – every year. In other words, 
household out-of-pocket expenses related to long-term care may be as much as 5% of annualized 
personal consumption expenditures in the U. S. Added to these direct expenses are losses due to 
taking time off of work, forgoing promotions, and contributing less to Social Security and 
savings/retirement accounts. It stands to reason that if the average caregiver experiences these 
kinds of financial responsibilities and consequences, not only can caregiving be expensive in the 
present, but it also may lead to delayed asset accumulation and insufficient retirement 
preparation among caregivers. As discussed in the next chapter, these potential impacts have not 
been sufficiently explored empirically – and although advocates for caregivers are inclined to use 
existing estimates to make the case for immediate relief for caregivers, more work is needed to 
understand the long-term financial impacts of caregiving. 
In addition to the financial consequences of informal caregiving, the significant physical 
and emotional toll must also be considered in a discussion of the economic impacts of informal 
caregiving, since these result in higher morbidity and mortality for those who are providing 
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direct care (Pinquart & Sörenson, 2003). Perceptions of strain are highly correlated with the 
physical and mental health impacts, which is of particular concern because perceptions of strain 
are increasing as more care recipients are staying or moving back home rather than living in an 
institutional setting (Reinhard, Levine, & Samis, 2012). Although a more detailed description of 
the physical and mental health impacts of caregiving is beyond the scope of this paper, these 
impacts are relevant to the extent that informal caregiving decreases in individual’s earning and 
saving potential and increases a caregiver’s risk of experiencing his or her own LTC needs in the 
future. As mentioned earlier, health and financial capability are intertwined; therefore, although a 
review of the caregiver health literature is not provided here, any discussion of the potential for 
caregiver responsibilities to undermine financial capability is not complete without mention of 
the negative health impacts of caregiving. As a result, the health status of caregivers was 
included in the analysis conducted as part of this study.  
Unfortunately, despite these expected financial burdens from long-term care, many 
households fail to prepare adequately for retirement and LTC needs. In fact, a recent study found 
that when long-term care insurance, health costs, and other retirement needs are taken into 
account, roughly 65% of all households will be “at risk” of being unable to maintain their 
standard of living in retirement, with probabilities increasing by generation such that a full 72% 
of Generation Xers (those born in 1965-1974) will be at risk (Munnell, Webb, Golub-Sass, & 
Muldoon, 2009). Even though mandatory Social Security participation provides a guarantee of 
some income in later life, most Social Security payments are not adequate to pay for significant 
LTSS. Thus, the significant tension between family and public financing of LTC remains 
unresolved – expenses on both fronts are unsustainable now, there is a risk that the problem will 
get worse, and no real solutions are on the horizon. 
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Chapter 2. What we know about the financial impacts of caregiving 
As the foregoing discussion indicates, informal caregiving has significant direct and 
indirect costs. It is unknown, however, the extent to which these expenses have lingering effects 
on informal caregivers. It stands to reason that if caregiving leads to decreased income, it may 
also lead to decreases in retirement savings and other types of asset development. However, the 
direct impact of informal caregiving on lifetime asset accumulation has not been documented; 
instead, analyses of impacts on income and assets have used mostly cross-sectional data, and are 
often not nationally representative. This chapter offers a brief review of the literature and 
theories that relate to the economic impacts of informal caregiving, followed by a presentation of 
the research questions driving the present study and the hypotheses that were tested.  
 
Previous Empirical Work 
While there is a relatively large body of empirical work exploring the physical and 
mental health effects of caregiving, less is known about the financial impacts. A few studies have 
sought to quantify both the direct costs and the effects on wages for caregivers, but most of this 
research relies on cross-sectional data, uses samples that are not nationally representative, and is 
largely a-theoretical in approach. As a result, existing knowledge about the financial toll of 
caregiving is somewhat speculative, and requires generalizations that may or may not be 
supported by the data used.   
One approach that had been used frequently to understand the financial toll of caregiving 
is to quantify the impact of caregiving on wages and work behavior among working caregivers. 
There is evidence that caregiving leads to a reduction in work hours, and that some caregivers 
take unpaid leave or quit working altogether in order to provide care (Stone, Cafferata, & Sangl, 
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1987; NAC/AARP, 2009). Conclusions about wealth are drawn by extrapolating long-term 
wealth impacts from information about loss of wages, foregone promotions and raises, and 
decreased contributions to pensions and Social Security. One influential and frequently cited 
study of this type is the Metlife Juggling Act Study (Metlife Mature Market Institute [MMI], 
1999), which was one of the first attempts to quantify the full range of costs borne by working 
caregivers. The study concluded that respondents lost an estimated $659,139 in wealth over their 
lifetime as a result of lost wages and decreases in contributions to pensions and Social Security. 
Unfortunately, the study had a sample size of 55 respondents, all of whom were working and 
were selected because they reported that they had made accommodations at work as a result of 
caregiving responsibilities. The study is important because it attempts to quantify the costs in a 
wide range of domains, including foregone promotions and raises, decreases in contributions to 
savings and retirement funds, and expenses that reduce discretionary income. However, the study 
is not representative of all caregivers – and the estimated costs are not generalizable, even among 
employed caregivers. 
More recently, MMI, in collaboration with National Alliance for Caregiving and the 
Center for Long-Term Care Research and Policy at the New York Medical College, revisited the 
topic by analyzing nationally representative data from the 1998 wave of the Health and 
Retirement Study (HRS) to further understand the costs to caregivers who are also employed 
(MMI, 2012). They estimate that in 2008, nearly 10 million people over age 50 were serving as 
caregivers for a parent – defining caregivers broadly as those providing help with basic personal 
tasks or providing financial assistance. They also found that the average loss to a working 
caregiver’s retirement funds (defined as wages, pensions and Social Security contributions) was 
$304,000 for this population, with women losing more ($324,000) than male caregivers 
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($284,000).  Again, however, these estimates are based on cross-sectional data, and include both 
caregivers who donate time and those who are providing financial assistance to a parent – a 
definition of caregiving that is broader than that used in many other studies. Because of the 
cross-sectional nature of the approach, it is unknown whether these impacts of caregiving are 
long-lasting, or if caregivers are able to recoup some losses after the caregiving experience has 
ended (either by returning to work or through bequests from the care recipient). Further, 
including those who provide financial assistance with those who provide time may confuse the 
issue of financial impacts – it is expected that those who help care recipients with expenses will 
see an immediate financial effect, while it is less clear whether caregivers who provide help with 
personal tasks also experience financial impacts.  
Another approach to understanding financial impacts is to quantify caregiver expenses. 
For instance, in a telephone survey of 1000 self-identified caregivers, Evercare, in collaboration 
with the National Alliance for Caregiving (Evercare/NAC, 2007), asked caregivers to recall how 
much they spend on caregiving (or on behalf of their care recipient) in a typical month. 
Caregivers were defined as those who provided an average of five or more hours a week of 
assistance in the past month, and the assistance was defined as help with either ADLs or IADLS 
– that is, a fairly broad definition of caregiving was used. Respondents reported an average of 
$5,531 in direct caregiving expenses annually – more than 10% of the median income of the 
sample. Further, 38% of respondents reported cutting back on personal savings patterns in order 
to accommodate the costs of caregiving. Among the 41 people who agreed to keep a daily diary 
of expenses for one month, the average expenditure was much higher: $12,348. These figures are 
alarming, and have been used widely by the mainstream media, financial planners, and advocacy 
groups to demonstrate the financial toll of caregiving (see, for instance: APA, 2013; Carthage 
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Press, 2012; Wells Fargo, n.d.). In fact, the estimates are often generalized as an average for all 
caregivers; a CDC webpage for cancer caregivers, for instance, says, “Caregiving can create 
immediate and long-term financial problems for caregivers. Many caregivers give money to the 
patient—$200 per month on average—and spend an average of $5,531 per year out-of-pocket on 
expenses related to caregiving” (CDC, 2012). However, the study sample used to derive this 
figure is not representative of all caregivers in the U.S., and it may be that some caregivers spend 
far less. Further, some caregivers may spend this amount for a short time, but the long-term 
impacts on caregiver finances may be far less extreme.  
Another approach used by some to investigate the financial impacts of caregiving is to 
assess caregivers’ perception of financial strain. Most notably, financial strain has been 
incorporated into several larger assessment instruments, such as the Caregiver Strain Index 
(Robinson, 1983) and Modified Caregiver Strain Index (Thornton & Travis, 2003); the Zarit 
General Burden Inventory (Zarit, Reever, & Bach-Peterson, 1980); and the Cost of Care Index 
(Kosberg & Cairl, 1986).  Further, one stand-alone financial strain assessment tool, the Financial 
Impact Scale, was developed by Todtman and Gustafson (1991), and has been used in at least 
one other small, mixed-methods study (Murdoch, 2003). Both the Todtman & Gustafson and 
Murdoch studies found significant financial strain among the populations surveyed, and yet 
unfortunately the Financial Impact Scale has not been validated with larger populations. Several 
other studies have assessed perceived financial strain as part of a broader assessment of caregiver 
burden (Cantor, 1983; Scharlach & Boyd, 1989). Cantor (1983), for instance, found that financial 
strain was a significant concern among all caregivers, but that the strain was most pronounced 
among spousal caregivers. Across all groups in Cantor’s study, however, financial strain was not 
as much of a concern as physical and emotional health concerns. Consistent with this finding, 
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George & Gwyther (1986) found no evidence of financial strain among caregivers of people with 
dementia, despite finding evidence of significant negative impacts in the social and mental health 
domains of well-being. It should be noted, however, that the studies finding little or no evidence 
of financial strain reflect findings from the 1980s, and caregiver experiences are likely to be 
substantially different now.  
Together, empirical work over the last three decades suggests that there may be some 
negative impacts on income, which have the potential to decrease retirement preparation and 
asset accumulation. However, to date, this relationship has not been established using 
longitudinal analysis, and connections to existing theory about household savings patterns have 
not been made. A significant difference between this study and previous work is that this study 
uses a longitudinal approach to model the impact of caregiving on wealth over time, rather than 
at one discreet observation point. Another difference is that existing information about financial 
impacts are purely descriptive and have not been grounded in theory, while this study seeks to 
anchor an exploration of the relationship between caregiving and assets in an existing economic 
theory, described next, which is used to understand the longitudinal nature of asset accumulation 
and decumulation, but which has not been applied to caregiving to date. 
 
Theoretical Framework 
Life-Cycle Hypothesis of Saving. The concept of wealth trajectories is grounded in the 
life-cycle hypothesis (LCH) of saving, first proposed by Modigliani and Brumberg (1954), and 
expanded by Ando and Modigliani (1963), Kotlikoff, Spivak, and Summers (1982) and 
Modigliani (1986). LCH posits that savings occur across a lifespan in the shape of a bell curve, 
with net wealth starting at zero in childhood and adolescence – as parents invest resources into 
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children – and then increasing in early adulthood as the individual enters the labor market. 
Wealth accumulation peaks at retirement, after which dissaving or decumulation commences, 
with the expectation that wealth diminishes steadily until death (Modigliani and Brumberg, 
1954), as depicted in Figure 1. 
Figure 1. Life-cycle theory of wealth (Brown, 2011) 
  
Later variations on this theory hypothesized that dissaving may be mitigated by a 
“bequest motive,” such that an individual may retain some savings with the intention of passing 
it along as a bequest to children or other family members. This simple conceptualization has 
been challenged more recently; for instance, Blinder, Gordon and Wise (1981) found that in fact, 
among many families, dissaving in later life does not necessarily occur, and yet the bequest 
motive for savings is only weakly supported. An alternative explanation for the propensity to 
accumulate assets throughout retirement is that Social Security and other pensions may serve as a 
substitute for employment income later in life, allowing individuals to retain assets rather than 
spend them, but the substitution effect is not perfect and some evidence is contradictory (Blinder, 
Gordon and Wise, 1981; Land & Russell, 1996). Lastly, some hypothesize that those who are 
risk averse will retain assets in anticipation of expenses in later life related to health events or 
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other catastrophic needs; once again, however, there is scant evidence to support this hypothesis. 
Therefore, many questions remain about why some individuals save more than others, and why 
some spend down wealth later in life while others do not. Caregiving may be one of the reasons 
that some save and others do not, but this dynamic has not been explored fully. 
Recent work in this field has investigated the effect of major life events, such as the loss 
of a spouse, on household wealth (Sevak, Weir, & Willis, 2003). Major health shocks later in 
life, including the onset of illness or a sudden accident causing disability, may also have 
significant impacts on income and assets (Hurd & Reardon, 2003; Lee & Kim, 2008; Smith, 
1999). These impacts are found to be more lasting among the oldest old, and less so among those 
who are pre-retirement. Also, the financial consequences of poor health may be more significant 
for women than for men (Kim, 2006), as well as for members of minority populations (Bond 
Huie, Krueger, Rogers, & Hummer, 2003; Kim & Lee, 2005), and the effects of the two combine 
to make minority women particularly vulnerable to experiencing negative financial consequences 
from health shocks (Butrica & Iams, 2003). Thus, health shocks are widely understood to be one 
predictor of financial difficulty in later life, and yet studies exploring this phenomenon have 
focused almost exclusively on finances of the individual experiencing the health shock, not on 
the indirect effects on the caregivers. More work needs to be done to understand whether these 
health events have a similar economic shock effect on caregivers.  
The life cycle hypothesis informs this study in three ways. First, it conceptualizes wealth 
accumulation/decumulation as occurring in a trajectory over time. Second, the theory 
incorporates the idea of shocks as a determinant of the shape of these trajectories. Third, it 
suggests that trajectories vary by subgroups, such as among women and racial/ethnic minority 
populations. However, economic studies that test the impacts of factors such as gender and race, 
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or the impacts of shocks from health or marital events, do not explain these impacts with a 
specific theoretical framework; therefore, adding a life course perspective to these economic 
analyses has the potential to clarify the changes in wealth patterns that occur among specific 
subgroups.  
The Life Course Perspective. The life-course perspective locates families within multi-
faceted social, historical and geographical contexts, while also acknowledging the links between 
individuals within the family and the trajectories of individual experience through time. As 
outlined by Elder (1998), the life course perspective identifies six principles that guide 
understanding of human development. Although the life-course perspective is not discussed 
widely in empirical studies of nationally representative economic data, the principles outlined by 
Elder, as described below, can offer important contributions to the exploration of household 
savings patterns. 
1) Historical and geographic location. Individual and family experience must be 
understood in part as a function of the historical and geographic location in which they occur. 
For instance, the relevance of research into informal care in the U.S. in the 21st century is partly a 
function of historical forces: the baby boom, which has altered the ratio of older adults to 
children in society; medical and technological advances that help to extend life expectancies well 
beyond where they were 100 years ago (and well beyond where they are in less developed 
countries); and industrialization, which has spurred an increase in the geographical distance 
between family members while also increasing the financial resources available to families to 
pay for formal care services.  
2) Timing in lives. The caregiving experience may be qualitatively different depending on 
when it occurs in someone’s life. For instance, a growing body of literature focuses on the 
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“sandwich generation,” comprised of those who are both raising children and caring for an aging 
parent(s) simultaneously. The pressures and rewards of this experience may be quite different 
than those experienced by a 70-year old caring for an ailing spouse, and, particularly relevant for 
this analysis, the long-term financial impacts of caregiving may change substantially based on 
the timing of the caregiving experience.  
3) Linked lives. This principle acknowledges that individuals’ lives are interconnected, 
and that the experience of one family member may well impact that of another. This is 
particularly relevant to instances of caregiving. One person’s long-term health need, and the 
resulting financial impacts on the care recipient, may have important ripple effects both within 
the family and among seemingly unrelated individuals – for instance, when coverage for LTC 
services creates strain on state budgets and prompts cuts in other state expenditures.  
4) Human Agency. The life course perspective asserts that even though various social and 
historical contexts influence individual experience, individuals are still actors in their own lives. 
Thus, although external contexts may impact the financial wellbeing of caregivers, they are also 
impacts by their own degree of risk aversion, propensity for saving, career choices and ability to 
work before, during and after the caregiving experience. 
5) Diversity of Experience. This principle recognizes that while some commonalities are 
inherent in cohorts of individuals – baby boomers, for instance, have experienced certain 
historical landmarks that helped shaped their experience collectively – there is still important 
heterogeneity of experience within cohorts. Among caregivers, these within-cohort differences 
will be equally important; that is, the experience of female caregivers may be different than that 
of male caregivers, and the degree of self-determination available to individuals may vary by 
culture of origin, neighborhood, and other socio-economic factors.  
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6) Cumulative effects of advantage and disadvantage. Usually, caregiving for an older 
adult occurs in mid- to late-life. Prior to this experience, various life experiences may have 
helped an individual either to build resources for resilience, or to compromise their capacity for 
resilience. Thus, the caregiving experience may occur in two individuals’ lives when they are the 
same age and under similar contextual circumstances, but will be qualitatively different because 
of previous life experiences and the cumulative effects of advantage and disadvantage. These 
differences may lend crucial insight into why some caregivers report that the caregiving 
experience is rewarding, while other report adverse effects on health, mental health, and 
household finances. 
When household savings patterns are viewed from the perspective of these six life course 
principles, an important conclusion is that wealth trajectories may not be homogenous, but 
instead may differ substantially depending on historical, social, and personal contexts. Brown 
(2011), for instance, found that the negative effects of race and gender intersect and accumulate 
over the life course, such that Black women have very low levels of net worth and that these 
levels remain relatively flat, rather than increasing as the LHC hypothesis would suggest. Cross-
sectional analysis of wealth for women and men of color produced similar findings: wealth 
disparities exist by race, with African-Americans and Latinos having vastly lower amounts of 
wealth than their White counterparts, and for women, who have much lower amounts of wealth 
than men (Oliver & Shapiro, 2006; Chang, 2012). The race and gender gaps have intersecting 
impacts, such that women of color have the lowest median wealth when compared both to men 
of color and to White women (Chang, 2010). 
In sum, not only may wealth trajectories differ in magnitude – that is, some individuals 
may have a much steeper wealth accumulation curve than others – but the trajectories may also 
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differ in overall shape: some may follow the standard bell shape, while some others may remain 
flat, and still others may have dips related to shocks, as described above.  The potential for 
heterogeneity in wealth trajectories has important implications for selection of analytic methods, 
as discussed in the next chapter.  
 
Study questions 
As suggested by the life course perspective, the potential negative financial impacts of 
caregiving may have particular relevance for those who are already financially vulnerable. 
Women, for instance, are more likely to experience poverty in later life than men (Hudson, 
2010), and since a majority of caregivers are women, the financial consequences of caregiving 
may compound an existing economic disadvantage. Similarly, some minority populations in the 
U.S. – African-Americans and Latinos in particular – have higher rates of poverty overall and 
may be disproportionately strained by the demands of caregiving (Collins, Hall, & Neuhaus, 
1999; Rank & Williams, 2010). Thus, while caregivers overall may be conceptualized as a 
vulnerable population, subgroups such as racial minorities and women may be especially 
vulnerable, and therefore particularly relevant to social workers and policy makers. 
 Caregiving can have economic effects in a number of areas such as income, employment 
status, and wealth (or net worth), which includes savings, pensions and retirement accounts, 
investments, home equity and/or business equity, minus any debts. In this study, wealth 
trajectories are the dependent variable of interest, rather than income and employment status. A 
wealth trajectory is the pattern of asset accumulation and decumulation over time (Bernheim & 
Scholz, 1992). The aim of the study is to identify how the experience of providing informal care 
to a parent impacts caregivers’ wealth trajectories. Because little is currently known about 
 32
investment and saving patterns among informal caregivers, the study seeks to identify the 
relationship between caregiving and wealth trajectories first by comparing caregivers to 
noncaregivers. Then, because certain groups are more vulnerable to poverty than others, the 
study examines differences in wealth patterns among caregivers who differ by various caregiver 
attributes – such as gender, race, and income – and by attributes of the caregiving experience, 
such as duration and intensity. The following research questions, therefore, guide the 
investigation: 
Research Question 1: Does caregiving affect wealth trajectories?  
Hypothesis 1.1: Caregiving will be negatively associated with wealth trajectories. 
Research Question 2: Do caregivers’ wealth trajectories vary by caregiver attributes? 
Hypothesis 2.2: Female caregivers will experience greater negative change in wealth 
trajectories over time than men. 
Hypothesis 2.3: Race/ethnicity will predict membership in groups for whom caregiving 
negatively impacts wealth trajectories. 
Hypothesis 2.4: Education will predict membership in groups for whom caregiving 
negatively impacts wealth trajectories. 
Hypothesis 2.5: Caregivers’ health will be negatively associated with wealth trajectories 
in groups for whom caregiving is also negatively associated. 
Hypothesis 2.6: Marital status will predict membership in groups for whom caregiving 
negatively impacts wealth trajectories. 
Research Question 3: How do the duration and intensity of the caregiving experience 
impact caregivers’ wealth? 
Hypothesis 3.1: Duration of the informal caregiving experience is associated with a 
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larger negative effect on caregivers’ wealth trajectories over time. 
Hypothesis 3.2: Intensity of the caregiving experience is associated with larger negative 
effect on caregivers’ wealth trajectories over time. 
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Chapter 3. Data and Methods 
Challenges of testing of wealth hypotheses 
Despite the predominance of the LCH and life course perspective as an explanatory 
model of household savings patterns, there have been few direct empirical tests of the theory, in 
part because such tests have proved difficult to accomplish. Bernheim (1987), in fact, provides 
the first empirical test using longitudinal, panel data, and finds the theory not fully supported by 
the data. Land and Russell (1996) mention the challenges related to finding suitable longitudinal 
data; in particular, they argue that data extending across the lifespan is needed to fully test the 
LCH. Many data sets that collect comprehensive economic data from households do not collect 
panel data for more than a few years.  As a result, most studies rely on cross-sectional analysis to 
make longitudinal inferences about life cycle savings behavior.  
This study seeks to address some of the data and methodological challenges, while 
acknowledging that difficulties remain. First, the study uses data from the Health and Retirement 
Study (HRS), which contains comprehensive household economic data from a nationally 
representative panel of adults aged 51 and above. The dataset does not contain complete life-
cycle data for respondent households at this time – respondents enter the study at age 51 or 
above, and although their families (including children) are tracked, even the oldest original 
respondents and their offspring have not been in the study long enough to have complete life 
cycle information yet. However, there is the potential to study respondents who entered the study 
while still in their peak earning years, and who are tracked until death.  
Second, the study conceptualizes wealth as occurring in a trajectory that is latent – not 
directly observed, but measured in part through regular observations of asset holdings and debt. 
In the case of the HRS, values for these measures are observed every two years; thus, although 
 36
complete life cycle data is not available, inferences about later life may be drawn by analyzing 
multiple waves of data to understand the latent trajectories that may be at work.  
It is important to note the particular challenges that accompany applying latent growth 
curve analysis to wealth measures. First, wealth is notoriously skewed, and the distribution of 
wealth across negative and positive values makes statistical transformations problematic. 
Friedline, Masa, and Chowa (2012) provide a helpful review of these challenges, and propose 
several approaches to transformation of wealth data. A more detailed explanation of how the 
skewness challenges are dealt with in the present study is provided below.  
Another challenge implicit in applying longitudinal approaches to analyzing wealth data 
is that linear growth curve models assume that wealth occurs in a homogenous pattern across the 
population – that is, that while the starting values and magnitude of change may differ across 
respondents, the overall pattern of wealth accumulation and decumulation will look the same. 
Latent growth curve models take a different approach by allowing group-based analyses, in 
which both the shape and the magnitude of trajectories may fall into natural groupings. Two 
major types of growth curve analyses have emerged from this perspective: growth mixture 
modeling, as described by Bollen and Curran (2006), which uses an SEM framework to test 
categorical groupings of trajectories that may be either linear or quadratic in shape, and group-
based growth modeling, as described by Nagin (1999), which uses a similar approach but 
assumes homogeneity within groups in order to test between-group differences that may be 
linear, quadratic, or cubic. A strength of these approaches is that both time-varying and time-
invariant covariates can be tested for their impacts on the outcome variable, although the growth 
mixture models test direct effects of covariates at each wave on the outcome measures at each 
wave, while the group-based growth models allow testing of the effects of the covariates on both 
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the starting parameters and the trajectory shape (as expressed by the linear, quadratic, and cubic 
terms).  
All three of these approaches have strengths and limitations, and, therefore, selection of 
method is most appropriately driven by the theory of change that is being tested. For the 
purposes of this study, linear growth curve modeling would be inappropriate given the life 
course perspective, which suggests that a variety of trajectories may emerge based on the 
cumulative experiences of individual respondents. Further, the ability to test cubic terms is 
important, particularly for testing whether the financial impacts of caregiving were significant 
but short-lived – causing a short-term dip in net worth with a subsequent rebound (which might 
imply a cubic trajectory shape) – or if the effects were more lingering (implying a linear or 
quadratic shape). Therefore, the group-based growth modeling approach was selected as best 
suited to test the theory of change in wealth described above.  
 
Study design 
To understand how wealth trajectories differ between caregivers and noncaregivers, and 
among subgroups of caregivers, this study utilizes data from a panel of respondents who were 
not caregivers at the start of the study, but who became caregivers for a parent or parent-in-law at 
some point during 10 years (6 waves) of observations. These respondents were compared to 
those who never became caregivers during the study, and, within caregivers, comparisons were 
made by caregiver attributes such as gender and race. Additionally, information about the types 
of long-term care services being used by the care recipient allowed for examination of how the 
use of formal care services impacted the caregivers’ wealth trajectories. 
This investigation focuses on parental caregivers and not spousal caregivers. There are 
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several reasons for this design decision. First, parental assets are not included in the caregivers’ 
household asset measure in the HRS. By contrast, in cases of spousal caregiving, the financial 
impacts of the care recipient’s health status would be confounded with the financial impacts of 
the caregiving experience. Further, there is some evidence that there are meaningful differences 
in caregiver outcomes depending on the relationship of caregiver to care recipient – for instance, 
spousal caregivers tend to have more mental health difficulties than parental caregivers (Pinquart 
& Sörenson, 2003). Therefore, focusing on only one type of caregiver/care recipient relationship 
may avoid some of the confounding effects of relationship dynamics. Lastly, because more than 
50% of caregivers in this age range provide care for a parent or parent-in-law (NAC/AARP, 
2009), concentrating on parental caregivers provides relevant and useful information about the 
caregiving experience for people aged 50 and above.  
 
Sample  
Data for this study is drawn from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS). The original 
HRS cohort, sampled and surveyed in 1992, is a nationally representative sample of individuals 
born from 1931 to 1941, with oversampling for African-Americans, Latinos, and residents of the 
state of Florida (Heeriga & Connor, 1995). Surviving respondents have been surveyed every two 
years since 1992. The HRS has since expanded to include additional cohorts of older adults so 
that it now provides statistically representative samples of all U. S. households with adults aged 
50 and above (Hauser & Willis, 2005). Designed to collect information about financial status, 
labor participation, and health within the households, the HRS is now a leading source of 
information about older adults in the United States (National Institute on Aging, 2009).  
 Because of substantial variation in measurement of caregiving in the first three waves of 
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HRS data collection, data for this study are drawn from waves four through nine (1998-2008). 
Inclusion criteria at baseline for this study were: (a) respondents had a parent or parent-in-law 
alive in 1998; (b) respondents were aged 51-67 in 1998; and (c) respondents were not caregivers 
for a parent at baseline, as discussed above. There were 3107 individuals meeting these criteria 
in 1998. Including only noncaregivers at baseline allows for creation of a comparison group of 
individuals who never became caregivers during the 10 years of observation in this study.  Figure 
2 shows the number of people at each wave who identified as caregivers for either a parent or 
parent-in-law. It is expected that there will be significant, but not complete, overlap of identified 
caregivers from wave to wave.  
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Figure 2. Description of Dissertation Sample 
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Power Analysis. Power issues were considered for all analyses. Although no specific test 
of statistical power is available for latent growth curve analysis, a data set with at least 300 cases 
is generally considered to offer sufficient power for analysis (Andruff, Carraro, Thompson, 
Gaudreau & Louvet, 2009).  
 
Measures  
Wealth. The dependent variable for all measures was the net worth of respondents’ 
households after accounting for debt, as described below. Total dollar value, rather than the 
amount of change as a percentage of total wealth, was used because the total value allowed for 
plots of trajectories of wealth to be created, which provided added clarity for interpretation.  
Construction of wealth measures varies quite a bit in the literature. This is an important 
consideration, both because inclusion and exclusion of certain types of assets may significantly 
alter the findings. For instance, some studies in the economic literature include pensions, Social 
Security contributions, and stock investments but do not include housing equity (Shapiro, 2006); 
similarly, business equity is not always included. Home and business equity are often excluded 
to keep the asset measure consistent with Medicaid eligibility criteria or because they are not 
always used as a source of income during retirement; however, borrowing against such equity 
may be an important source of funds upon which caregivers can draw during times of intense 
caregiving, and therefore their value may be directly impacted by the caregiving experience. 
Therefore, wealth was operationalized here as the sum of savings, pensions, investments, and 
home and business equity, minus any debts reported by the respondent. This is consistent with 
studies on wealth by Attanasio and Hoynes (2002), Brunnermeier and Nagel (2001), Friedman 
and Sjogren (1981), and King and Leape (1987).  
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A second challenge with regard to measurement of assets is determining whether to 
include income as part of a measure of overall household wealth. Certainly income is important 
in determining ability to purchase formal care, and at the same time having a higher amount of 
income may allow some households to forego spending down assets or accumulating debt. For 
these reasons, some studies in the economic literature use household wealth – including both 
assets and income – as the dependent variable (Smith, 1999), while others break income and 
wealth into separate categories, often looking at just income rather than at wealth. However, 
since contribution to savings, pensions, and other investments is dependent in part on income, 
adding the two may work as a measure of wealth for cross-sectional analysis but may confound 
the findings when used as a single dependent variable in longitudinal studies. Thus, for the 
purposes of this study, the sum of assets minus debts was considered to be the relevant variable, 
with an understanding that income, as an independent variable, was significantly correlated to 
wealth. 
In all analyses, the RAND imputations for these variables were used; the values were 
converted to 2008 dollars using consumer price index conversion values, then divided by the 
number of wage earners included in the household in order to account for the fact that assets and 
debts were measured at the household level, while key covariates, such as race and gender, were 
measured at the individual level. In order to address issues of skewness, a log-transformation of 
the wealth variable was used; log10 was chosen for ease of interpretation, although sensitivity 
analysis with a natural-log transformation was also conducted and did not result in significantly 
different results. Because wealth ranges from negative to positive values, and includes zero 
values, transformation was accomplished by adding $1 to all values, taking the absolute value, 
applying the log10 transformation, and then reapplying the negative sign when appropriate. The 
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transformation improved the skewness and kurtosis dramatically, as shown in Table 1. Although 
the skewness and kurtosis of the transformed wealth variable are still slightly outside the 
preferred range, the LTA method is a semi-parametric analysis method, and is robust to non-
normality in the dependent variable (in fact, it assumes non-normality). 
Table 1. Measures of central tendency, dependent variable at baseline. 
 Range Mean Median Mode S.D. Skewness Kurtosis 
Assets, 
adjusted  
-$2,390,848.94 to 
$20,976,253.30 
$251,767.35 $103,562.00 0 654,271 15.92 413.47 
Assets, 
Log2 
-14.69 to 16.86 10.41 11.55 0 4.52 -3.20 10.61 
Assets, 
Log10 
-6.38 to 7.32 4.52 5.02 0 1.96 -3.20 10.61 
 
Independent variables. Many of the major independent variables were time variant, 
such as marital status, health, income, and caregiving status. Other variables, such as education 
and ethnicity, were assumed to be invariant across time. Notes on the operationalization of each 
measure within the survey are provided in Table 2. The role and time-variance status of each 
variable are also noted.  
Caregiving status is a dichotomous variable generated by questions about whether the 
respondent has spent at least 100 hours in the previous 12 months providing personal assistance 
with ADLs to a parent and/or step-parent. This is expected to vary over time, but all respondents 
will have a caregiving status of “no” or “0” at wave one. A separate measure of caregiving, 
which measures assistance with “personal errands” – or activities generally classified as IADLs – 
is also available in the dataset; for the purposes of this study, however, caregiving was 
operationalized by the more restrictive definition of providing ADL care. Assistance with ADLs 
is generally thought of as more intense and potentially stressful than assistance with IADLs 
because of the personal nature of ADL tasks (such as bathing and toileting). People needing 
ADL assistance usually have a higher level of disability than those who only need assistance 
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with IADLs, and so it may be that caregivers who assist a parent with ADLs experience higher 
levels of stress, more impacts on work, and, therefore, a larger negative impact on assets.   
Other independent variables used in research questions one and two are fairly standard 
measures of demographic and socio-economic status; these include race, gender, self-reported 
health, education, marital status, and income. It should be noted that the HRS dataset 
oversamples African-American and Hispanic respondents; when sampling weights are applied, 
analyses can test differences among Whites, African-Americans, and Hispanics, but finer 
distinctions cannot be tested. For this study, person-level weights from 1998, the first 
observation point in the study, were used for all analyses. Using the first-wave weights rather 
than the last-wave weights allowed for the data from every original member of the sample to be 
used, regardless of their dropout status in subsequent waves. 
Because time-invariant measures are included in the trajectory models as dichotomous 
“risk factors,” race was dummy-coded into three dichotomous measures: White vs. other, 
African-American vs. other, and Hispanic vs. other. Also, because of similar methodological 
limitations, marital status at each wave was recoded into a dichotomous measure of 
married/partnered vs. unmarried. Those who were divorced, widowed and never married were 
collapsed into one group. Lastly, a similar transformation was applied to the time-invariant 
measure of education: those with 12 years of education or less were grouped together and 
modeled against those with more than 12 years of education. 
For research question three, time-variant measures of caregiving duration and intensity 
are used. Duration is measured by summing the number of observations in which the respondent 
reported providing care for a parent or step-parent; two measures are used to capture those who 
only provide ADL care and those who help with ADLs, IADLs, or both. These are crude 
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measures of caregiving duration, since the actual start dates and end dates for caregiving 
responsibilities are not known; however, variation in this approximate measure of years spent 
caregiving may still be meaningful in relation to latent asset trajectories. For the second 
hypothesis, the effect of caregiving intensity is modeled using a continuous measure of the 
number of hours of care provided during the previous two years as reported by the respondent. 
One important note is that, when respondents are initially unsure about the number of hours of 
care, some data on caregiving intensity are imputed by HRS staff based on respondents’ answers 
to probes about hours of care. 
Table 2. Description of Study Measures  
Construct/Variable Description/Question Role 
Wealth 
Home equity Current value of your home, minus amount owed on it. (continuous) DV, time 
variant 
Pension/IRA 
wealth 
Type and amounts in the top three pension plans. (continuous) DV, time 
variant 
Investment wealth Questions about stocks, bonds, treasury bills, other investments. 
(continuous) 
DV, time 
variant 
Savings wealth Total amount in checking and savings accounts. (continuous) DV, time 
variant 
Business wealth Total value of business holdings, minus amount owed. (continuous) DV, time 
variant 
Debt Seven items assess debt including type (credit card, medical, life 
insurance policy loans, loans from relatives) and amount owed. 
(continuous) 
DV, time 
variant 
Total Wealth (Assets – Debt) DV, time 
variant 
Income 
Employment 
income 
Income from work for pay (continuous) IV, time 
variant 
Non-employment 
income 
Questions re: amount of income from Workers’ Compensation, 
Unemployment Insurance, and SSI/SSDI (continuous) 
IV, time 
variant 
Social Security 
income 
Amount of Social Security Income (not SSI or disability); 
(continuous) 
IV, time 
variant 
Total Income (Employment + Non-employment + Social Security) IV, time 
variant 
Caregiving Experience 
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Caregiving status Dichotomous based on response to following two questions: 
 
IV, time 
variant 
ADL assistance Did you or your partner/spouse spend at least 100 hours in the past 12 
months helping your mother or father (or step-parent) with basic 
personal activities like dressing, eating, and bathing? 
IV, time 
variant 
IADL assistance Did you or your partner/spouse spend at least 100 hours in the past 12 
months helping your mother or father (or step-parent) with other 
things such as household chores, errands, transportation, etc.? 
IV, time 
variant 
Caregiving 
duration 
Continuous measure, calculated by summing number of observation 
points at which respondent was a caregiver for at least 100 hours in the 
past 12 months 
IV, time 
variant 
Caregiving 
intensity 
Continuous measure of number of hours reported in each wave; the 
measure is imputed using hotbox imputation when caregivers do not 
provide an estimate of hours (Smith, 1995) 
IV, time 
variant 
Socio-Demographics 
Age Respondent age at time of observation. IV, time 
variant 
Race Measured for each respondent at entry into the study, as determined by 
response to these two questions: “Do you consider yourself primarily 
white or Caucasian, Black or African American, Other?” and “Do you 
consider yourself Hispanic or Latino?” 
IV, time 
invariant 
Gender Measured dichotomously (male/female), and is input by the 
interviewer rather than in response to an interview question.  
IV, time 
invariant 
Marital Status Measured at each wave with a series of questions based on status at 
intake; measure is cleaned and imputed by RAND, and 
operationalized as categorical with the following categories: Married, 
Married/Spouse absent, Partnered, Separated, Divorced, 
Separated/Divorced, Widowed, Never Married.  
IV, time 
variant 
Education Education is measured for each respondent at entry into the study, as 
determined by response to this question: “What is the highest grade of 
school or year of college you completed?” (continuous) 
IV, time 
invariant 
Self-rated health Health is assigned based on health of respondent at each wave, as 
determined by response to this question: “Would you say your health 
is excellent, very good, good, fair, or poor?” 
IV, time 
variant 
 
Analytic Strategy 
Data preparation and preliminary analyses. In preparation for testing hypotheses, all 
independent variables were examined to understand their distributions and to test for normality. 
As described above, wealth measures were transformed using a log10 transformation to address 
skewness. Similarly, income measures were also transformed with a natural log. The RAND 
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dataset was used whenever possible, which means that all variables – except the measures of 
caregiving status, duration and intensity – were cleaned and imputed by RAND. In most cases, 
this involved “logical imputation,” meaning that, when possible, missing answers are imputed 
based on answers to related questions. For example, if a respondent indicated that his or her 
father had deceased in one wave, but values for this measure were missing in subsequent waves, 
the “deceased” status was carried forward (RAND, 2011). 
Imputed measures are not available for the caregiving variables, and, because of the skip 
patterns built into the HRS interviews, missing values in caregiving present something of a 
challenge. Respondents were asked at each wave whether they provided 100 or more hours of 
care to their mother or father (or step-mother and/or step-father) in the past 12 months. The first 
set of questions refers to “personal care such as dressing, eating, or bathing;” a second set of 
questions refers to “other things such as household chores, errands, transportation, etc.” 
Respondents were given opportunities to list multiple care recipients in all cases, and details 
about the care, including an estimate of the number of hours of care provided, were obtained for 
each care recipient. Response options for the initial caregiving questions at each wave include 
“yes,” “no,” “don’t know,” and “refused.” The measures were set to missing during the interview 
if the interview was truncated or if a skip pattern was invoked – that is, when a question was 
deemed “inapplicable” for a number of reasons, which included situations in which the parents 
had been marked deceased in a prior wave, the designated respondents for family questions was 
not available, or the interview was incomplete for other reasons. As a result, there is a large 
number of values in each wave that are set to missing, but some values are missing at random 
while others are attributable to parent mortality. For the purposes of this study, all missing cases 
are left as missing, and the few respondents who answered “don’t know” or who refused to 
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answer the question were recoded to “missing” as well. As discussed below, adjustments for 
missingness due to parent mortality are addressed in model building rather than through 
imputation. 
With the exception of missing values in the caregiving questions, most missingness in the 
dataset is attributed to death or respondent drop out. Attrition by death was responsible for less 
than 3% of attrition at each wave, as illustrated in Table 3. Latent trajectory analysis is robust to 
missing values when they are MAR or missing completely at random, as long as values are 
available for at least one wave for each case. In this situation, the underlying latent data structure 
is analyzed with maximum likelihood estimation using the available observed values (Bollen & 
Curran, 2006). Because missingness in the caregiving values is not missing at random – that is, 
the reason for some missingness is attributable to parent mortality or respondent drop-out – 
variables that correlate with this observed missingness are included: one variable for wave 
participation is included to account for wave-to-wave drop out, and one variable indicating 
whether there is at least one living parent is included to account for missingness due to the 
“inapplicability” of the question (Ferrer, Hamagami, and McArdle, 2009). Values for these two 
dummy variables are included in the table below; it should be noted that the combined sum of 
these two variables is slightly higher than the missing value for caregiving at each wave because, 
if the parent died in the two years since the last interview, questions about caregiving within 
those two years are still asked.  
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Table 3. Missing values by variable and wave. (n=3107) 
 Wave 1 Wave 2 Wave 3 Wave 4 Wave 5 Wave 6 
Respondent not present 
in wave 
0 241  
(7.76%) 
327 
(10.52%) 
457 
(14.71%) 
560 
(18.02%) 
646 
(20.79%) 
Missing by death 
(cumulative) 
0 27  
(0.87%) 
75  
(2.41%) 
120  
(3.86%) 
178  
(5.72%) 
250  
(8.05%) 
Missing by death 
(wave-to-wave attrition) 
0 27  
(0.87%) 
48  
(1.56%) 
45  
(1.48%) 
55  
(1.84%) 
72  
(2.46%) 
Age 0 241 327 457 560 646 
Race 0 - - - - - 
Gender 0 - - - - - 
Education 8 - - - - - 
Health 0 242 330 458 562 647 
Marital Status 3 245 332 459 560 646 
Wealth  0 242 330 458 562 647 
Income  0 242 330 458 562 647 
Caregiving       
= missing 1 4 7 3 3 3 
= n/a  0 292 739 1249 1644 2014 
Dummy variables used to account for missingness 
All parents are deceased 
(0=deceased) 
0 372 
(13.17%) 
787 
(28.76%) 
1094 
(41.95%) 
1373 
(54.77%) 
1583 
(65.31) 
Respondent not in wave 
(0=not in wave) 
0 241  
(7.76%) 
327 
(10.52%) 
457 
(14.71%) 
560 
(18.02%) 
646 
(20.79%) 
 
Hypothesis testing. Latent trajectory analysis (LTA), or group-based modeling of 
development, is a semi-parametric approach that is particularly well suited to questions about 
how longitudinal trajectories differ among groups of cases (Nagin, 1999; Andruff, et al., 2009), 
and will therefore be applied to all research questions. LTA is performed with SAS ®, version 
9.3 for Windows (SAS Institute, Cary, NC, 2012), using an application called PROC TRAJ, 
which is available from the Carnegie Mellon University website (Jones, 2012). Unlike standard 
growth modeling, which averages trajectories of individual cases to establish a typical pattern of 
change over time and then calculates the degree to which individual cases vary from the group 
mean, LTA is designed to group cases into several different patterns based on specified 
differences between groups (Nagin, 1999). This is particularly useful when the expectation is 
that between-group differences will result in trajectories of different shapes (Andruff, et al., 
2009). For instance, for some hypotheses, it is expected that wealth will continue to accumulate 
 51
for some categories of caregivers, while at the same time wealth will decrease or remain flat for 
others. LTA is designed to be sensitive to such changes, while standard growth modeling 
techniques would average the groups and could potentially report insignificant findings as a 
result. Additionally, the method allows for testing of significance of quadratic and cubic terms 
when at least four observation points are available, which allows for analysis of groups for which 
assets may follow a complex, non-linear path. Group assignments are based on probabilities of 
group membership and should not, therefore, be interpreted as fixed or definite; however, post-
hoc analyses can be performed to determine characteristics of the groups based on respondents’ 
probable group membership.  
Because of the heterogeneous and continuous nature of wealth’s distribution across the 
population at each wave, tests of model fit with the group-based modeling approach can be 
misleading (Tyson Brown, personal communication, Dec. 6, 2012). PROC TRAJ assumes that 
the dependent variable’s distribution is not normally distributed, but rather, that its distribution is 
best explained as homogenous within groups. Thus, PROC TRAJ requires users to specify the 
number of group being tested in each model, and as groups are added, the Bayesian Information 
Criterion (BIC) for the two models are compared to evaluate model fit. Modeling wealth using 
this technique can be difficult; although wealth is not normally distributed – and the distribution 
may be explained in part by natural groupings that can be estimated as a function of exogenous 
predictors – the “true” number of groups that explain the non-normal distribution may be quite 
large because of the large range and heterogeneity in the wealth measures. Therefore, adding 
groups to the model often produces better model fit even when the percentage of respondents 
assigned to each groups drops to a very small number. As a result, the BIC test may indicate that 
a model with N groups may fit the data better than a model with N-1 groups, even when only one 
 52
or two respondents fall into the Nth group. Therefore, model fit must be assessed both by 
comparing BIC scores and by making subjective decisions based on theory and the degree to 
which groups have enough cases to be substantively meaningful.  
An example of the syntax used to estimate models for this study is provided in Figure 3, 
below. In this example, a three-group model is specified; the intercepts and linear, quadratic, and 
cubic slopes of the assets trajectories are estimated using the log10 transformation of wealth at 
each wave (LOGGASSETSx), which are modeled against a time-varying dummy variable, 
INTYEARx, which represents time. Caregiving status (ADLx), the response status dummy 
variable (INWx), and the parent mortality status dummy variable (WxPARENT), are included as 
time-varying covariates (TCOV) of assets, while gender (RAGENDER) is a time-invariant “risk 
factor” or exogenous predictor of the latent parameters. The ID variable points to the case 
number for each respondent, and the WEIGHT variable points to the individual-level weights in 
the first wave. (Using starting weights rather than ending weights allows for inclusion of 
respondents who dropout in later waves.) In the model statement, the censored normal 
distribution of the dependent variable is specified; zero-inflated Poisson or Bernoulli 
distributions are also supported in PROC TRAJ. The number of groups to be modeled is 
specified by NGROUPS, and the linear, quadratic, and cubic slopes to be estimated are specified 
in the ORDER statement. In this case, cubic slopes are tested for groups 1 and 2, but not for 
group 3. Though not shown here, start values for each of the parameters in the model can be 
specified in advance to facilitate model estimation.  
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Chapter 4. Results 
Description of sample and results of univariate analyses. As shown in Table 4, 
application of inclusion criteria resulted in a sample size of 3107 respondents, of whom 65% 
(n=2019) were female. Ages ranged, per inclusion criteria, from 51 to 67, with a mean age of 
57.12. Respondents’ education ranged from 0 to 17 years, with a mean of 12.81 years and a 
median of 12 years. Roughly 75% (n=2326) of respondents were White/Non-Hispanic, while 
15% (n=259) were African-American and 8% (n=454) were Hispanic; 68 respondents, or 2%, 
identified as another race. Approximately 18% (n=550) respondents reported excellent health at 
Wave 1, while just over 22% (n=694) reported fair or poor health. Three-fourths of respondents 
(n=2298, 74%) were married or partnered at baseline, while 713 (23%) were divorced or 
widowed and 93 (3%) were never married. Respondents had a mean adjusted income of $51,428 
(median = $36,280) at baseline, with a range of $0 to $5,213,510. The mean adjusted wealth 
value at baseline was $251,767 (median = $103,562), with a range of -$2,390,849 to 
$20,976,253. A full summary of descriptive statistics at baseline is included in Table 4. 
Additionally, a chart depicting comparisons of both median and mean values of wealth (adjusted 
to 2008 dollars, divided by the number of household wage earners, and multiplied by sample 
weights) is shown in Figure 4. Caregivers and non-caregivers show remarkably similar wealth 
patterns when depicted in this way.  
Because of the wide range and presence of extreme outliers in the dependent variable, 
additional analysis of the five highest and lowest cases was conducted. The values for wealth in 
these cases are consistent with values in prior and subsequent waves, and seem congruent with 
other data related to each case. Thus, these values are retained. 
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Table 4. Description of Sample at Baseline 
 Wave 1 Wave 2 Wave 3 Wave 4 Wave 5 Wave 6 
N= 3107 2866 2780 2650 2547 2461 
Time-invariant covariates (frequencies) 
Gender 1088  
(35% male) 
2019 (65% 
female) 
     
Education (recoded) 
≥ 12 yrs. 1649 (53%)      
< 12 yrs. 1458 (47%) 
 
     
Race 
White = 2374 
(81.47%) 
     
African-
Am.= 
409 
(14.04%) 
     
Other = 131 (4.50%)      
Time-varying dependent variable (means, with standard deviations) 
Wealth  
(adjusted) 
$233,978.33 
(811,247.23) 
$258,305.31 
(754,185.05) 
$258,483.16 
(673,649.14) 
$289,093.48 
(971,340.11) 
$347,664.79 
(1,461,104.16) 
$306,052.16 
(845,946.16) 
Wealth 
(log10) 
4.48 (1.90) 4.54 (1.85) 4.55 (1.88) 4.47 (2.05) 4.50 (2.08) 4.54 (2.14) 
Time-varying covariates (means/standard deviations, or frequencies) 
Age 60.82  
(29-97; 
5.61) 
62.69  
(31-99; 
5.60) 
64.59  
(34-102; 
5.56) 
66.52  
(37-104; 
5.51) 
68.46  
(40-105; 5.45) 
70.30  
(39-107; 
5.44) 
 
Health 
Excellent 550 (18%) 517 (18%) 439 (16%) 372 (14%) 340 (13%) 252 (10%) 
Very Good 970 (31%) 1001 (35%) 928 (33%) 823 (31%) 829 (33%) 778 (32%) 
Good 893 (29%) 771 (27%) 816 (29%) 840 (32%) 773 (30%) 829 (34%) 
Fair 488 (16%) 340 (12%) 424 (15%) 444 (17%) 420 (16%) 420 (17%) 
Poor 206 (7%) 175 (6%) 170 (6%)  170 (6%) 183 (7%) 181 (7%) 
 
Marital Status 
Married/ 
partnered 
2298 (74%) 2104 (73%) 2006 (72%) 1891 (71%) 1793 (70%) 1670 (68%) 
Divorced/ 
Widowed 
713 (23%) 672 (23%) 697 (25%) 681 (26%) 686 (27%) 720 (29%) 
Never 
married 
93 (3%) 86 (3%) 76 (3%) 76 (3%) 68 (3%) 71 (3%) 
Income  
(mean, 
adjusted) 
$37,902.76 
(81,000.94) 
$38,067.46 
(78,479.66) 
$36,693.43 
(83,884.68) 
$39,461.70 
(68,012.02) 
$40,324.33 
(181,663.51) 
$40,787.29 
(462,910.68) 
Income 
(loge) 
10.05 (1.21) 10.04 (1.23) 10.03 (1.21) 10.59 (1.30) 10.06 (1.19) 10.03 (1.27) 
 
Caregiving 
= n/a 0 292 (10%) 739 (26%) 1249 (45%) 1644 (65%) 2014 (82%) 
= no 2914 (94%) 2041 (71%) 1266 (44%) 918 (33%) 690 (27%) 497 (20%) 
= yes 0 553 (19%) 428 (15%) 407 (15%) 347 (14%) 289 (12%) 
Care 
Intensity 
(# of hrs.) 
0 5433 (5099)
 
Care Duration 
= 0 3107 (100%) 2819 (91%)
= 1 
- 290 (9%)
= 2 
- - 
= 3 
- - 
= 4 
- - 
= 5 
- - 
 
  
 
Figure 3. Comparison of Weighted 
Non-caregivers (NCG) 
 
Analysis of all research questions was conducted using the PROC TRAJ procedure in 
SAS ® version 9.3 (SAS Institute, Inc., Cary, NC, 2012). Models were tested with specifications 
of 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 groups. To refine these models, each was originally estim
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 5716 (4937) 5822 (5091) 6498 (5053)
 2597 (84%) 2438 (78%) 2328 (75%)
 448 (14%) 522 (17%) 574 (18%) 
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quadratic, and cubic terms along with the per-wave response indicator, the parent mortality status 
indicator, and the covariate(s) of interest. Parameters were evaluated for significance, and using 
the original model’s start values, models were re-estimated without the non-significant cubic and 
quadratic terms. This process was continued until a model was identified in which all non-
significant parameter estimates for the asset trajectory were eliminated, leaving only estimates 
for relevant trajectory terms and covariates, as well as all non-significant intercepts and linear 
parameters. BIC statistics for each of these final models were compared and model fit was 
assessed using a combination of these fit statistics and substantive significance of the groups 
identified. For the first question, all models are shown with an explanation how the best fitting 
model was selected. For subsequent hypotheses, only the best fitting model is presented and 
discussed; other models that were tested are included in Appendix A. 
 
Research question 1. Does caregiving affect wealth trajectories?  
Hypothesis 1.1: Caregiving will be significantly and negatively associated with 
wealth trajectories. This question was tested by modeling trajectories of wealth with the time-
varying, dichotomous measure of caregiver status as a covariate. A summary of the model results 
is included in Tables 5-9. In each model, caregiving status is negatively associated with at least 
one group’s trajectory, meaning that caregiving status has a negative impact on the overall 
trajectory of wealth. As the summary indicates, fit statistics continue to improve as groups are 
added to the model; however, the magnitude of the largest group remains relatively stable – with 
an overwhelming majority of respondents experiencing a relatively stable, flat trajectory of 
wealth over time. Thus, adding groups serves to split the remaining group of respondents into 
increasingly smaller groups, with each resulting group represented by a very different trajectory. 
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As predicted, the cubic term is significant with at least one, and often more, groups per model. In 
general, the cubic term was usually significant for the group in which caregiving was also 
significant, meaning that this group experiences more volatility in wealth over time than groups 
for which caregiving is not significant. This suggests that the hypothesis is supported, with 
caregiving having a significant and negative impact on wealth trajectories for at least a small 
percentage of respondents regardless of the number of groups specified.  
It is interesting to note that in some of the models, parent mortality status is also 
significantly associated with the wealth trajectory of some groups. In a few cases, this 
significance occurs simultaneously with caregiving significance, such that the death of a parent is 
associated with a drop in wealth for groups where caregiving is also associated with a drop in 
wealth. For other groups, parent status has the opposite effect, such that the death of a parent is 
positively associated with wealth. It may be that for this group, the death of a parent results in a 
bequest that positively impacts the wealth trajectory.  
Also of note is the fact that using a dummy variable to represent sample attrition causes 
the intercepts of most groups to be highly non-significant – in many cases, with p ≈ 1. This 
occurs because the t-tests assess whether the mean for each group is significantly different from 
0, and in groups with high attrition, the mean is likely to be close to 0. Therefore, despite the 
non-significance of the intercepts, the overall models and slope parameters may still be 
interpreted. 
A model with four groups fit best, with the trajectory of Group 2 significantly impacted 
by caregiving status. Caregiving status was negatively associated with this group’s trajectory, 
meaning that caregivers were likely to have a lower trajectory than noncaregivers in this group. 
Roughly 4.3% of respondents were assigned to this group based on confidence intervals.    
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Table 5. 2-group model 
 Parameter β S.E. P 
Group 1 Intercept 2.24 58.04 .97 
 Linear 0.11 0.12 .36 
 Caregiving (Yes=1) -1.78 0.61 .00 
 Respondent in wave 
(Yes=1) 
-1.17 58.01 .98 
 Parent living (Yes=1) -0.60 0.53 .26 
     
Group 2 Intercept 5.40 1.93 .01  
 Linear 0.15 0.03 .00  
 Caregiving (Yes=1) -0.02 0.00 .00  
 Respondent in wave 
(Yes=1) 
-0.51 0.65 .43 
 Parent living (Yes=1) -0.06 0.03 .06  
     
 Sigma  1.38 0.04 .00 
BIC = -23319.81 (N = 3092) 
Table 6. 3-group model 
 Parameter β S.E. p 
Group 1 Intercept 3.22 5.05 0.52 
 Linear -1.57 0.58 0.01 
 Quadratic 0.18 0.09 0.04 
 Caregiving -1.85 0.56 0.00 
 Respondent in wave  0.44 4.11 0.92 
 Parent living  -0.24 0.81 0.77 
     
Group 2 Intercept -4.86 134.20 0.97 
 Linear 13.98 1.18 0.00 
 Quadratic -3.45 0.38 0.00 
 Cubic 0.27 0.04 0.00 
 Caregiving  0.20 0.45 0.72 
 Respondent in wave  -9.52 135.88 0.94 
 Parent living  0.30 0.44 0.50 
     
Group 3 Intercept 5.80 2.48 0.02 
 Linear 0.07 0.02 0.00 
 Quadratic -0.01 0.00 0.05 
 Caregiving  -0.02 0.04 0.71 
 Respondent in wave  -0.74 3.39 0.83 
 Parent living  -0.07 0.03 0.03 
     
 Sigma  1.23 0.04 0.00 
BIC = -22217.07 (N = 3092) 
Table 7. 4-group model 
 Parameter β S.E. p 
Group 1 (3.63%) Intercept -6.30 643.03 0.99 
 Linear 14.58 14.58 0.00 
 Quadratic -3.61 -3.61 0.00 
 Cubic 0.29 0.29 0.00 
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 Caregiving  0.17 0.55 0.76 
 Respondent in wave  -8.72 643.94 0.99 
 Parent living  0.42 0.45 0.35 
     
Group 2 (4.28%) Intercept 6.33 26.62 0.81 
 Linear -7.03 1.80 0.00 
 Quadratic 2.26 0.59 0.00 
 Cubic -0.22 0.06 0.00 
 Caregiving  -1.68 0.60 0.01 
 Respondent in wave  2.42 28.05 0.93 
 Parent living  -2.54 0.65 0.00 
     
Group 3 (3.73%) Intercept 0.67 1244.73 1.00 
 Linear 6.28 2.44 0.01 
 Quadratic -2.71 0.82 0.00 
 Cubic 0.30 0.08 0.00 
 Caregiving  -0.51 0.50 0.31 
 Respondent in wave  -4.74 1246.69 1.00 
 Parent living  3.90 0.97 0.00 
     
Group 4 (88.35%) Intercept 5.96 192.22 0.98 
 Linear 0.10 0.02 0.00 
 Quadratic -0.01 0.00 0.00 
 Caregiving  0.00 0.04 0.98 
 Respondent in wave  -0.95 192.21 1.00 
 Parent living  -0.03 0.03 0.24 
     
 Sigma  1.14 0.03 0.00 
BIC = -23319.81 (N = 3092) 
Table 8. 5-group model 
 Parameter β s.d. p 
Group 1 (2.73%) Intercept 0.76 187.10 1.00 
 Linear 0.12 0.16 0.50 
 Caregiving  -1.81 0.95 0.01 
 Respondent in wave  -1.40 187.02 1.00 
 Parent living -0.74 0.88 0.43 
     
Group 2 (3.46%) Intercept -5.62 151.99 0.97 
 Linear 15.64 1.14 0.00 
 Quadratic -3.99 0.36 0.00 
 Cubic 0.32 0.03 0.00 
 Caregiving  -0.42 0.44 0.39 
 Respondent in wave  -9.03 151.29 0.96 
 Parent living  -0.32 0.27 0.24 
     
Group 3 (87.36%) Intercept 4.85 217.66 0.98 
 Linear 0.08 0.02 0.00 
 Quadratic -0.01 0.00 0.20 
 Caregiving -0.00 0.04 0.88 
 Respondent in wave 0.18 217.66 1.00 
 Parent living  -0.02 0.03 0.35 
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Group 4 (2.75%) Intercept 10.72 86.48 1.00 
 Linear -14.73 2.42 0.00 
 Quadratic 5.10 0.76 0.00 
 Cubic -0.52 0.10 0.00 
 Caregiving -1.78 1.62 0.27 
 Respondent in wave 4.81 4195.50 1.00 
 Parent living  -1.61 0.85 0.06 
     
Group 5 (3.70%) Intercept 2.34 6528.09 1.00 
 Linear 5.76 2.13 0.01 
 Quadratic -2.63 0.76 0.00 
 Cubic 0.30 0.08 0.00 
 Caregiving -0.66 0.54 0.23 
 Respondent in wave -4.82 6526.67 1.00 
 Parent living  2.90 1.10 0.01 
     
 Sigma  1.08 0.03 0.00 
BIC = -20948.13 (N = 3092) 
Table 9. 6-group model 
 Parameter β s.d. p 
Group 1 (2.70%) Intercept  187.10  
 Linear  0.16  
 Caregiving  0.95  
 Respondent in wave  187.02  
 Parent living   0.88  
     
Group 2 (3.55%) Intercept -5.71 152.00  
 Linear 15.54 1.14  
 Quadratic -3.99 0.36  
 Cubic 0.32 0.03  
 Caregiving -0.31 0.44  
 Respondent in wave -8.76 151.29  
 Parent living  -0.34 0.27  
     
Group 3 (86.76%) Intercept 4.58 217.66  
 Linear 0.08 0.02  
 Quadratic -0.01 0.00  
 Caregiving 0.00 0.04  
 Respondent in wave 0.45 217.67  
 Parent living  -0.02 0.03  
     
Group 4 (3.65%) Intercept 9.00 86.48  
 Linear -10.63 2.42  
 Quadratic 3.52 0.76  
 Cubic -0.35 0.07  
 Caregiving -0.11 2.09  
 Respondent in wave 3.80 84.81  
 Parent living  -1.41 1.03  
     
Group 5 (2.73%) Intercept 0.19 16912.33  
 Linear 9.82 3.52  
 Quadratic -4.07 1.16  
 61
 Cubic 0.44 0.11  
 Caregiving -0.51 0.75  
 Respondent in wave -6.08 16908.82  
 Parent living  3.62 1.11  
     
Group 6 (0.60%) Intercept 12.66 349.69  
 Linear -9.93 0.95  
 Quadratic 1.72 0.16  
 Caregiving -6.61 1.57  
 Respondent in wave 5.32 349.96  
 Parent living  -6.91 0.55  
     
 Sigma  1.06 0.03  
BIC = -20794.69 (N = 3092) 
Because the size of groups continues to decrease below 3% when five or more groups are 
modeled, the 4-group model is deemed best, even when the BIC statistic improves with 
additional groups. A graph of the estimated trajectories that correspond with the four-group 
solution is provided in Figure 6. In the figure, the dashed lines indicate predicted trajectories, 
while the corresponding solid line shows the trajectory that best fits the observed measures. In 
general, as discussed above, intercepts are not significant. However, parameter estimates of the 
shape of the trajectories are significant, which suggests that while the starting points of the 
trajectories may not be predicted by these models, the overall shape of the trajectories, and the 
relationship of the covariates to the trajectories, can be interpreted.  
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Figure 4. Wealth trajectories with a 4-group model 
 
 
Research question 2: Do caregivers’ wealth trajectories vary by caregiver attributes? 
Hypothesis 2.1: Female caregivers will experience greater negative change in wealth 
trajectories over time than men. To test this hypothesis, gender was added to the previous 
model by identifying it as a time-invariant “risk” factor. Interestingly, gender was not a 
significant predictor of membership in any of the groups identified in the 4-group model. In fact, 
gender only emerged as a significant predictor for one group in the 5-group model, and not for 
any groups in the smaller models. This finding is contrary to findings in other studies on wealth 
and gender. Caregiving remains significantly and negatively related for one group in this model 
(β = -1.69, S.E.= 0.61, p=.01). Based on fit statistics and the size of groups in the larger models, 
a four-group solution is presented here.  
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Table 10. 4-group model with gender as risk factor 
 Parameter β S.E. p 
Group 1 (3.7%) Intercept -6.29 527.45 0.99 
 Linear 14.63 1.73 0.00 
 Quadratic -3.64 0.60 0.00 
 Cubic 0.29 0.06 0.00 
 Caregiving 0.17 0.54 0.76 
 Respondent in wave -8.71 528.49 0.99 
 Parent living  0.44 0.46 0.34 
Risk: Female Constant 0.00 -- -- 
     
Group 2 (4.3%) Intercept 6.30 30.24 0.84 
 Linear -7.04 2.00 0.00 
 Quadratic 2.26 0.63 0.00 
 Cubic -0.22 0.06 0.00 
 Caregiving -1.69 0.61 0.01 
 Respondent in wave 2.38 32.10 0.94 
 Parent living  -2.52 0.77 0.00 
Risk: Female Constant -1.17 0.91 0.20 
 Gender 0.82 0.55 0.13 
     
Group 3 (3.7%) Intercept 0.74 111.43 0.99 
 Linear 6.18 2.88 0.03 
 Quadratic -2.68 0.94 0.00 
 Cubic 0.30 0.09 0.00 
 Caregiving -0.51 0.51 0.32 
 Respondent in wave -4.67 99.50 0.96 
 Parent living  3.87 1.13 0.00 
Risk: Female Constant -0.72 0.65 0.27 
 Gender 0.47 0.38 0.22 
     
Group 4 (88.3%) Intercept 5.96 6.93 0.39 
 Linear 0.10 0.02 0.00 
 Quadratic -0.01 0.00 0.00 
 Caregiving 0.00 0.04 0.99 
 Respondent in wave -0.95 8.24 0.91 
 Parent living  -0.03 0.03 0.25 
Risk: Female Constant 2.60 0.54 0.00 
 Gender 0.37 0.34 0.27 
     
 Sigma  1.14 0.03 0.00 
BIC = -21505.10 (N = 3092) 
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Figure 5. Graph of trajectories in 4-group model with gender as risk factor. 
 
Hypothesis 2.2: Race/ethnicity will significantly predict membership in groups for 
whom caregiving significantly and negatively impacts wealth trajectories. Similar to the 
models with gender, this hypothesis was tested by adding race as a risk factor. Models with the 
dichotomous measure of White/non-Hispanic vs. Other are presented here, although models with 
other dichotomous categorizations of race (African-American vs. Other, and Hispanic vs. Other) 
had similar findings. For all groups, race was significantly related; Whites were less likely to be 
members of group 2 (β = -1.10, S.E.= 0.34, p<.01) and group 3 (β = -0.83, S.E.= 0.35, p=.02), 
and more likely to be members of group 4 (β = -0.70, S.E.= 0.27, p=.01). Caregiving was also 
significantly and negatively associated with the wealth trajectory of group 2 (β = -1.67, S.E.= 
0.60, p=.01), indicating that African-Americans and Hispanics were more likely to be members 
of the group for whom caregiving had a negative impact. Since group 4 is the group with the 
highest and most stable trajectory relative to the other groups, the finding that Whites are more 
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likely to be members of this group is also consistent with theory and findings in other studies. 
The graph of trajectories is not included here because the trajectories of all four groups are the 
same shape as in the chart presented for Hypothesis 2.1. See Figure 7. 
Table 11. 4-group model with White/Non-Hispanic as risk factor 
 Parameter β S.E. p 
Group 1 (3.6%) Intercept -6.32 3642.40 1.00 
 Linear 14.60 1.30 0.00 
 Quadratic -3.61 0.44 0.00 
 Cubic 0.27 0.04 0.00 
 Caregiving 0.16 0.55 0.77 
 Respondent in wave -8.73 3638.26 1.00 
 Parent living  0.42 0.45 0.35 
Risk: White=1 Constant 0.00 -- -- 
     
Group 2 (4.3%) Intercept 6.35 11.19 0.57 
 Linear -7.03 1.75 0.00 
 Quadratic 2.25 0.58 0.00 
 Cubic -0.22 0.06 0.00 
 Caregiving -1.67 0.60 0.01 
 Respondent in wave 2.44 12.04 0.84 
 Parent living  -2.57 0.62 0.00 
Risk: White=1 Constant 0.84 0.27 0.00 
 Race -1.10 0.34 0.00 
     
Group 3 (3.8%) Intercept 0.72 1649.76 1.00 
 Linear 6.19 2.04 0.00 
 Quadratic -2.68 0.70 0.00 
 Cubic 0.29 0.07 0.00 
 Caregiving -0.54 0.50 0.28 
 Respondent in wave -4.69 1648.34 1.00 
 Parent living  3.85 0.90 0.00 
Risk: White=1 Constant 0.58 0.29 0.04 
 Race -0.83 0.35 0.02 
     
Group 4 (88.3%) Intercept 5.96 47.29 0.90 
 Linear 0.10 0.02 0.00 
 Quadratic -0.01 0.00 0.00 
 Caregiving -0.00 0.04 0.97 
 Respondent in wave -0.95 47.28 0.98 
 Parent living  -0.03 0.03 0.21 
Risk: White=1 Constant 2.64 0.23 0.00 
 Race 0.70 0.27 0.01 
     
 Sigma  1.14 0.03 0.00 
BIC = -21441.72 (N = 3092) 
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Hypothesis 2.3: Education will significantly predict membership in groups for 
whom caregiving significantly and negatively impacts wealth trajectories. In order to assess 
the impact of education, the measure of a respondent’s years of education was recoded as a time-
invariant, categorical risk factor, with 0 signifying 12 years or less of education, and 1 indicating 
more than 12 years of education. The four-group model provided the best fit statistics while also 
producing groups that were large enough to be meaningful. Education was significantly and 
negatively related to membership in group 2 (β = -0.89, S.E.= 0.40, p=.03), indicating that those 
with more than a high school education were less likely to be members of this group. Group 2 
was also the group for which caregiving was significantly and negatively related (β = -1.63, 
S.E.= 0.62, p=.01), which suggests that education may be protective against the negative impacts 
of caregiving on wealth trajectories.  As with race, the graph of trajectories is not included here 
because the trajectories of all four groups are the same shape as in the chart presented for 
Hypothesis 2.1. See Figure 7 on page 62 for the relevant graph. 
Table 12. 4-group model with education as risk factor. 
 Parameter β S.E. p 
Group 1 (3.6%) Intercept -6.33 123.08 0.96 
 Linear 14.64 1.53 0.00 
 Quadratic -3.63 0.52 0.00 
 Cubic 0.29 0.05 0.00 
 Caregiving  0.16 0.54 0.77 
 Respondent in wave  -8.74 124.06 0.94 
 Parent living  0.42 0.45 0.35 
Risk: Education Constant 0.00 -- -- 
     
Group 2 (4.3%) Intercept 6.30 29.64 0.83 
 Linear -6.46 1.83 0.00 
 Quadratic 1.99 0.61 0.00 
 Cubic -0.19 0.06 0.00 
 Caregiving  -1.63 0.62 0.01 
 Respondent in wave  2.39 30.83 0.94 
 Parent living  -2.88 0.51 0.00 
Risk: Education Constant 0.49 0.23 0.03 
 Education -0.89 0.40 0.03 
     
Group 3 (4.1%) Intercept 1.11 1318.20 1.00 
 Linear 3.24 2.84 0.25 
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 Quadratic -1.47 1.12 0.19 
 Cubic 0.16 0.12 0.20 
 Caregiving  -0.29 0.80 0.72 
 Respondent in wave  -4.30 1315.89 1.00 
 Parent living  5.00 0.63 0.00 
Risk: Education Constant 0.32 0.28 0.26 
 Education -0.48 0.35 0.17 
     
Group 4 (88.1%) Intercept 5.96 4.29 0.16 
 Linear 0.08 0.03 0.01 
 Quadratic -0.01 0.01 0.31 
 Caregiving  -0.00 0.04 0.91 
 Respondent in wave  -0.95 4.47 0.83 
 Parent living  -0.02 0.03 0.47 
Risk: Education Constant 3.07 0.17 0.00 
 Education 0.24 0.27 0.37 
     
 Sigma  1.14 0.03 0.00 
BIC = -21474.54 (N = 3092) 
Hypothesis 2.4: Caregivers’ health will be significantly and negatively associated 
with wealth trajectories in groups with whom caregiving is also significantly and negatively 
associated. Self-reported health, a time-varying, categorical measure, was added as a covariate 
to the models. As in the prior cases, the four-group model provided the best balance between 
maximizing fit statistics and maintaining large enough sizes. The graph of trajectories is 
provided in Figure 8, with a summary of statistics in Table 13. With health added into the model, 
there remains one group for whom caregiving is significant, and the relationship is negatively 
associated with the wealth trajectory (β = -1.95, S.E.= 0.53, p<.01). Health is significantly and 
negatively significant for this group as well (β = -0.58, S.E.= 0.22, p=.01), indicating that as 
health ratings decrease, wealth also decreases, and there may be a compounding effect between 
caregiving and health. Health is significantly and negatively related to all four groups, as 
expected. 
 
 
 
 
 68
Table 13. 4-group model with health as a covariate. 
 Parameter β S.E. p 
Group 1 (3.32%) Intercept -5.49 154.69 0.97 
 Linear 12.41 1.50 0.00 
 Quadratic -3.51 0.49 0.00 
 Cubic 0.28 0.05 0.00 
 Caregiving  -0.10 0.62 0.87 
 Health -0.29 0.14 0.04 
 Respondent in wave  -7.90 155.71 0.96 
 Parent living  -0.45 0.47 0.33 
     
Group 2 (6.54%) Intercept 6.02 1.47 0.00 
 Linear -1.83 0.47 0.00 
 Quadratic 0.22 0.07 0.00 
 Caregiving  0.44 0.38 0.24 
 Health -0.37 0.09 0.00 
 Respondent in wave  2.11 0.51 0.00 
 Parent living -1.69 0.39 0.00 
     
Group 3 (86.31%) Intercept 5.41 0.21 0.00 
 Linear 0.10 0.01 0.00 
 Quadratic -0.01 0.00 0.00 
 Caregiving  0.02 0.03 0.54 
 Health -0.16 0.01 0.00 
 Respondent in wave  -0.01 0.22 0.98 
 Parent living  -0.03 0.02 0.14 
     
Group 4 (3.82%) Intercept 4.37 16.27 0.79 
 Linear -0.41 0.16 0.01 
 Caregiving  -1.95 0.53 0.00 
 Health -0.58 0.22 0.01 
 Respondent in wave  -2.55 16.03 0.87 
 Parent living  1.33 0.61 0.30 
     
 Sigma  1.13 0.03 0.00 
BIC = -21370.61 (N = 3092) 
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Figure 6. Graph of trajectories for 4-group health model. 
 
Hypothesis 2.5: Marital status will significantly predict membership in groups for 
whom caregiving significantly and negatively impacts wealth trajectories. Marital status was 
added to the model as a dichotomous measure in order to model changes in status over time; 
since categories of marital status are not ordinal, a more discriminating measure could not be 
incorporated into the model. As a result, all those who are single, regardless of previous marital 
history, are categorized together. When this dichotomous measure is added to the model, it is 
significantly and positively associated with the group trajectories of Group 2 (β = 2.69, S.E.= 
0.33, p<.01), Group 3 (β = 0.24, S.E.= 0.05, p<.01), and Group 4 (β = 0.63, S.E.= 0.25, p=.01), 
indicating that being married is associated with higher asset trajectories than being divorced, 
widowed, or never married. At the same time, the significance of caregiving disappears from the 
four-group model (though the significance of caregiving re-emerges in the five-group model).  
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Table 14. 4-group model with marital status as covariate. 
 Parameter β S.E. p 
Group 1 Intercept -6.28 50.76 0.90 
 Linear 14.73 1.14 0.00 
 Quadratic -3.69 0.36 0.00 
 Cubic 0.30 0.03 0.00 
 Caregiving  0.18 0.57 0.76 
 Marital Status -0.21 0.32 0.50 
 Respondent in wave  -8.69 50.98 0.86 
 Parent living  0.58 0.47 0.22 
     
Group 2 Intercept 5.74 12.37 0.64 
 Linear -6.92 1.30 0.00 
 Quadratic 2.21 0.55 0.00 
 Cubic -0.21 0.05 0.00 
 Caregiving  -0.65 0.56 0.25 
 Marital Status 2.69 0.33 0.00 
 Respondent in wave  1.83 13.09 0.89 
 Parent living  -2.23 0.50 0.00 
     
Group 3 Intercept 5.14 4.93 0.30 
 Linear 0.08 0.02 0.00 
 Quadratic -0.01 0.00 0.02 
 Caregiving  0.02 0.03 0.52 
 Marital Status 0.24 0.05 0.00 
 Respondent in wave  -0.28 4.91 0.96 
 Parent living  -0.04 0.03 0.17 
     
Group 4 Intercept 0.67 1173.84 1.00 
 Linear 6.13 2.14 0.00 
 Quadratic -2.60 0.78 0.00 
 Cubic 0.28 0.08 0.00 
 Caregiving  -0.53 0.47 0.26 
 Marital Status 0.63 0.25 0.01 
 Respondent in wave  -6.25 1173.36 1.00 
 Parent living  5.31 0.59 0.00 
     
 Sigma  1.12 0.03 0.00 
BIC = -23319.81 (N = 3092) 
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Figure 7. Graph of trajectories for 4-group marital status model. 
 
 
Modeling all covariates simultaneously 
Findings from each of the models described above suggest that there may be some 
interactions between the effects of caregiving on wealth and the effects of other caregiver 
attributes such as race or health, at least for some caregivers. However, none of these models 
tests whether these effects remain consistent in the presence of other covariates. Since the life 
course perspective and findings from other studies suggest that there is some intersectionality – 
that the effects of multiple life experiences may combine and accumulate to create larger effects 
on wealth over time – it was important to estimate a model in which all covariates are present 
simultaneously. Therefore, a final model was built using age, health, marital status, income, and 
caregiving status as time-varying covariates, with race (modeling White/Non-Hispanic vs. 
Other), education, and gender as time-invariant risk factors. With all covariates included, a five-
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group rather than four-group model fit best; parameters should be interpreted with caution, 
however, because eliminating cubic terms that were non-significant resulted in failed 
convergence. Results are presented in Table 15 and Figure 10, below. Although the parameter 
estimates may be somewhat unstable, they are consistent with findings from the models 
described above. For instance, caregiving remained significant and negatively associated with 
one group (β = -2.48, S.E.= 0.82, p<.01), and the size of that group (3.8%) was consistent with 
the models shown above. For this group, health was the only other covariate that was 
significantly associated, and the association, as expected, was negative (β = -0.94, S.E.= 0.31, 
p<.01). Race was also significant for this group, although the direction of the association 
changed: in this case, Whites were more likely to belong to the group for whom caregiving and 
health had a negative impact (β = 1.01, S.E.= 0.50, p=.04).  
In order to more fully understand the characteristics of each group, post-hoc analysis was 
conducted using the probability estimates produced by the TRAJ procedure. These 
characteristics are summarized in Table 16. Group 4, the group for which caregiving status was 
significantly related to asset trajectories, had 104 respondents at baseline, with attrition of 22% 
(n=81 in 2008). The group had a mean age of 57.14 at baseline and mean education of 10.58 
years. At all waves after the baseline wave, there were 8-10 people serving as caregivers (which 
was equivalent to 10% of group members in 2000, and nearly 20% in 2008). By that last wave, 
75 members of this group had never been a caregiver, with 18 identifying as a caregiver once 
during the study, 7 identifying as a caregiver twice, and 4 members serving as a caregiver for 3 
or more waves. This group displayed an interesting wealth pattern, with median wealth falling 
consistently across waves, but rising at the last wave. It may be that those who had the least 
wealth in the group were lost to attrition before the last wave.  
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Table 15. 5-group model 
 Parameter β s.d. p 
Group 1 (3.7%) Intercept 3.46 4943.33 1.00 
 Linear -11.32 4.37 0.01 
 Quadratic 3.70 1.42 0.01 
 Cubic -0.34 0.13 0.01 
 Age 0.15 0.05 0.01 
 Health -0.40 0.37 0.36 
 Marital Status -1.96 0.51 0.00 
 Income 0.37 0.17 0.03 
 Caregiving  -0.18 1.02 0.86 
 Respondent in wave  1.30 4946.07 1.00 
 Parent living  -2.87 0.62 0.00 
Risk Factors Constant 0.00 -- -- 
     
Group 2 (3.1%) Intercept -2.58 1489.30 1.00 
 Linear 15.61 1.13 0.00 
 Quadratic -3.78 0.37 0.00 
 Cubic 0.30 0.03 0.00 
 Age -0.11 0.04 0.00 
 Health -0.23 0.12 0.06 
 Marital Status 0.20 0.19 0.29 
 Income -0.06 0.09 0.50 
 Caregiving  0.12 0.60 0.84 
 Respondent in wave  -6.00 1487.88 1.00 
 Parent living  0.02 0.37 0.96 
Risk Factors Constant -0.10 0.73 0.89 
 Race 1.27 0.40 0.00 
 Education 0.17 0.57 0.77 
 Gender -0.46 0.47 0.32 
     
Group 3 (86.7%) Intercept 3.94 623.50 1.00 
 Linear -0.08 0.05 0.13 
 Quadratic 0.04 0.02 0.02 
 Cubic -0.00 0.00 0.01 
 Age 0.01 0.00 0.00 
 Health -0.12 0.01 0.00 
 Marital Status -0.11 0.04 0.00 
 Income 0.15 0.01 0.00 
 Caregiving  0.03 0.03 0.26 
 Respondent in wave  -0.72 623.50 1.00 
 Parent living  -0.03 0.02 0.14 
Risk Factors Constant -0.46 0.86 0.60 
 Race 1.01 0.50 0.00 
 Education 0.19 0.89 0.35 
 Gender -0.18 0.60 0.57 
     
Group 4 (3.8%) Intercept 5.19 459.45 0.99 
 Linear -4.57 2.94 0.12 
 Quadratic 1.70 1.03 0.10 
 Cubic -0.19 0.11 0.07 
 Age 0.01 0.05 0.76 
 Health -0.94 0.31 0.00 
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 Marital Status +0.63 0.40 0.11 
 Income 0.10 0.09 0.27 
 Caregiving  -2.48 0.82 0.00 
 Respondent in wave  -0.72 462.83 1.00 
 Parent living  3.88 0.83 0.00 
Risk Factors Constant -0.46 0.86 0.60 
 Race 1.01 0.50 0.04 
 Education 0.19 0.89 0.83 
 Gender -0.18 0.60 0.76 
     
Group 5 (2.7%) Intercept 2.66 11923.62 1.00 
 Linear 9.23 1.68 0.00 
 Quadratic -3.59 0.55 0.00 
 Cubic 0.37 0.05 0.00 
 Age -0.01 0.06 0.81 
 Health -0.12 0.17 0.49 
 Marital Status -0.67 0.27 0.02 
 Income 0.17 0.09 0.08 
 Caregiving  0.14 0.44 0.75 
 Respondent in wave  -4.50 11925.18 1.00 
 Parent living  -0.47 0.50 0.34 
Risk Factors Constant 1.03 0.77 0.18 
 Race 0.04 0.41 0.93 
 Education -0.30 0.65 0.65 
 Gender -0.44 0.52 0.39 
     
 Sigma  1.03 0.03 0.00 
BIC = -20353.59 (N = 3089) 
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Figure 8. Graph of trajectories for 5-group model. 
 
Table 16. Comparing characteristics of group in the 5-group summary model (all values are at 
baseline except care duration, which reflects duration in final wave) 
 Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Group 4 Group 5 
N 80 84 2691 104 133 
Attrition by final wave 18 (22.5) 18 (21.4) 547 (20.3) 23 (22.1) 31 (23.3) 
Gender F=55 (68.8),  
M=25 (31.3) 
F=52 (61.9), 
M=32 (38.1) 
F=1746 (64.9) 
M=945 (35.1) 
F=66 (63.5), 
M=38 (36.5) 
F=91 (68.4), 
M=42 (31.6) 
Race      
White = 42 (52.5) 54 (64.3) * 2132 (79.2) * 42 (40.4) * 49 (36.8) 
African-Am.= 27 (33.8) 21 (25.0) 313 (11.6) 33 (31.7) 55 (41.4) 
Other = 11 (13.8) 9 (10.7) 246 (9.1) 29 (27.9) 29 (21.8) 
Age 56.6 (4.0) * 57.1 (4.0) * 57.1 (4.2) * 57.1 (4.1) 57.4 (4.1) 
Education (recoded) 11.57 (3.2) 11.9 (3.3) 13.1 (2.8) 10.6 (4.1) 10.8 (3.4) 
Health      
Excellent 4 (5.0) 10 (11.9) * 515 (19.1) * 11 (10.6) * 10 (7.5) 
Very Good 17 (21.2) 16 (19.1) 897 (33.3) 16 (15.4) 23 (17.3) 
Good 22 (27.5) 28 (33.3) 778 (28.9) 30 (28.9) 31 (23.3) 
Fair 21 (26.3) 19 (22.6) 380 (14.1) 19 (18.3) 42 (31.6) 
Poor 16 (20.0) 11 (13.1) 121 (4.5) 28 (26.9) 27 (20.3) 
Marital Status      
Married/partnered 35 (43.8) * 45 (53.6) 2104 (78.3) * 48 (46.2) 59 (44.4) * 
Divorced/ Widowed 39 (48.8) 35 (41.7) 519 (19.3) 47 (45.2) 68 (51.1) 
Never married 6 (7.5) 3 (4.8) 65 (2.4) 9 (8.7) 6 (4.5) 
Income (mean) $19,948 * 
(17,879) 
$96,068 
(566,263) 
$53,703 * 
(64,323) 
20,900 
(25,541) 
21,974 * 
(23,949) 
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Wealth (mean) $34,965 
(91,543) 
-$51,226 
(260,623) 
289,076 
(693,611) 
29,462 
(49,520) 
13,694 
(49,369) 
Care Duration      
= 0 54 (67.5) 73 (86.9) 1920 (71.4) 75 (72.1) * 101 (75.9) 
= 1 20 (25.0) 9 (10.7) 554 (20.6) 18 (17.3) 22 (16.5) 
= 2 4 (5.0) 2 (2.4) 146 (5.4) 7 (6.7) 6 (4.5) 
= 3 2 (2.5) 0 53 (2) 2 (1.9) 4 (3.0) 
= 4 0 0 17 (0.6) 1 (1) 0 
= 5 0 0 1 (0.0) 1 (1) 0 
* = parameter estimate was significant (α =.05) 
 
Research Question 3: How do the duration and intensity of the caregiving experience 
impact caregivers’ wealth trajectories? 
Hypothesis 3.1: Duration of the informal caregiving experience is associated with a 
larger depressing effect on caregivers’ wealth trajectories over time. To test this hypothesis, 
a model was fit with care duration included as a time-varying covariate. For this question, 
analysis was limited to the population of respondents who became caregivers at some point 
during the study (n=869). Prior models indicated that becoming a caregiver was significantly and 
negatively associated with wealth, so excluding those who never became caregivers removed the 
initial effect of the jump from noncaregiver to caregiver. (Sensitivity testing with models that 
included all respondents confirms that care duration is significant for some groups when those 
who never become caregivers are included. Please see Appendix A for these results.) The sample 
was limited to those who had identified as a caregiver at least once, and because sample attrition 
was not a significant factor for this group, the dummy variable for respondent status was 
dropped. The dummy variable for parent mortality was retained, however, because of its 
relationship to eligibility to become a caregiver at any given wave.  
For all models using care duration as a covariate, care duration is not significant. As in 
other models, the four-group model is determined to fit the data best; group membership occurs 
in similar percentages as prior models, with a large majority (87%) belonging to a group with 
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relatively stable wealth over time. Neither in-wave status nor parent mortality status is 
significantly related to any trajectories. Also, it should be noted that the cubic term was not 
significant for any groups in this model, whereas the models that include non-caregivers (and 
that have at least one group for whom caregiving is negatively related to asset trajectories) do 
have significant cubic parameters in the caregiving group. This may indicate that the initial jump 
to caregiving status is where much of the impact on wealth occurs.   
Table 17. 4-group model with care duration as covariate. 
 Parameter β S.E. p 
Group 1 (2.54%) Intercept -0.02 0.46 0.97 
 Linear -0.57 0.17 0.00 
 Care duration  0.52 0.42 0.22 
 Parent living 0.00 0.71 1.00 
     
Group 2 (3.61%) Intercept 8.12 1.16 0.00 
 Linear -4.54 0.76 0.00 
 Quadratic 0.72 0.10 0.00 
 Care duration -1.16 0.73 0.11 
 Parent living  -0.28 0.62 0.65 
     
Group 3 (6.56%) Intercept 2.35 1.20 0.05 
 Linear 1.87 0.87 0..03 
 Quadratic -0.36 0.11 0.00 
 Care duration -0.57 0.47 0.22 
 Parent living  -0.72 0.47 0.13 
     
Group 4 (87.28%) Intercept 4.93 0.09 0.00 
 Linear 0.14 0.04 0.00 
 Quadratic -0.01 0.00 0.00 
 Care duration 0.02 0.04 0.62 
 Parent living  -0.03 0.04 0.47 
     
 Sigma  1.20 0.06 0.00 
BIC = -29561.41 (N = 869) 
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Figure 9. Graph of trajectories for 4-group model of care duration. 
 
Hypothesis 3.2: Intensity of the caregiving experience is associated with larger 
negative effect on caregivers’ wealth trajectories over time. To test this hypothesis, a measure 
of caregiving hours at each wave was included as a time-varying covariate. As with the analysis 
of care duration, the sample was limited to those who had identified as a caregiver at least once 
during the study period (n-869), and the in-wave dummy variable was dropped. The hours of 
care measure was significantly associated with two groups, but in opposite directions. In Group 
2, the relationship was negative, indicating that as hours of care increased, asset trajectories were 
negatively affected (β = -0.00, S.E.= 0.00, p<.01). In Group 3, the opposite effect was seen: care 
hours were positively associated with asset trajectories, indicating that trajectories increased as 
hours increased. In both cases, however, the parameter estimate was extremely small, however, 
and as the trajectory graph indicates, the slopes were quite volatile. Therefore, despite the 
statistical significance, the substantive impact of care hours may be negligible. 
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Table 18. 4-group model with hours of care as co-variate. 
 Parameter β S.E. p 
Group 1 (1.94%) Intercept -10.41 2.96 0.00 
 Linear 15.80 2.65 0.00 
 Quadratic -5.20 0.81 0.00 
 Cubic 0.49 0.08 0.00 
 Care hours  -0.00 0.00 0.15 
 Parent living  -3.36 0.66 0.00 
     
Group 2 (2.96%) Intercept 0.69 0.68 0.31 
 Linear 0.39 0.20 0.05 
 Care hours  -0.00 0.00 0.00 
 Parent living 1.57 0.64 0.01 
     
Group 3 (4.35%) Intercept 16.59 2.76 0.00 
 Linear -18.42 2.68 0.00 
 Quadratic 4.94 0.87 0.00 
 Cubic -0.39 0.09 0.00 
 Care hours  0.00 0.00 0.00 
 Parent living  -0.92 0.66 0.17 
     
Group 4 (90.76%) Intercept 5.10 0.06 0.00 
 Linear 0.05 0.01 0.00 
 Care hours  -0.00 0.00 0.13 
 Parent living  -0.06 0.05 0.27 
     
 Sigma  0.93 0.05 0.00 
BIC = -11342.04 (N = 869) 
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Figure 10. Graph of trajectories for 4-group model of care intensity. 
 
 
Summary of Findings 
Taken together, findings present mixed support for the study hypotheses. These findings 
are summarized in Table 19. Hypothesis 1.1 is partly supported, with at least some caregivers 
experiencing lower wealth trajectories when compared with non-caregivers. Hypotheses 2.2, 2.3, 
2.4 and 2.5 are moderately supported, in that caregiving is negatively associated with wealth 
trajectories for at least one group in each model. By contrast, hypothesis 2.1 was not supported, 
since gender was not significantly associated with wealth trajectories for any groups. Similarly, 
hypotheses 3.1 and 3.2 were not supported; care duration was not significantly related to wealth 
trajectories when wealth among caregivers was analyzed, and while care hours were, the 
direction of impact was mixed and the effect on trajectories was quite small.  
 81
Table 19. Summary of findings, by hypothesis 
Hypothesis Relationship tested Finding 
1.1 Caregiving will be significantly and 
negatively associated with wealth 
trajectories. 
Partly Supported: caregiving status negatively 
associated with one wealth trajectory group, 
representing 4.3% of respondents.   
Research Question 2 
2.1 Female caregivers will experience greater 
negative change in wealth trajectories over 
time than men. 
Unsupported: gender is not statistically associated 
with any trajectory groups. 
2.2 Race/ethnicity will significantly predict 
membership in groups for whom caregiving 
significantly and negatively impacts wealth 
trajectories. 
Supported: Race was negatively associated with 
the trajectory group for whom caregiving had a 
negative impact on asset trajectories, meaning that 
African-Americans were more likely than Whites 
to be members of this group.  
2.3 Education will significantly predict 
membership in groups for whom caregiving 
significantly and negatively impacts wealth 
trajectories. 
Supported: Education was negatively associated 
with the trajectory group for whom caregiving had 
a negative impact on wealth trajectories, meaning 
that those with lower education were more likely 
to be in this group. 
2.4 Caregivers’ health will be significantly and 
negatively associated with wealth trajectories 
in groups for whom caregiving is also 
significantly and negatively associated. 
Supported: Health was negatively associated with 
all trajectory groups, including that for whom 
caregiving status was also negatively associated, 
meaning that poorer health had a negative effect on 
wealth trajectories.   
2.5 Marital status will significantly predict 
membership in groups for whom caregiving 
significantly and negatively impacts wealth 
trajectories. 
Unsupported: Being married was positively 
associated with some wealth trajectories, but 
significance of caregiving status disappears from 
most models. 
Research Question 3 
3.1 Duration of the informal caregiving 
experience is associated with a larger 
negative effect on caregivers’ wealth 
trajectories over time. 
Unsupported: Care duration was not significantly 
associated with any trajectory groups. 
3.2 Intensity of the caregiving experience is 
associated with larger negative effect on 
caregivers’ wealth trajectories over time. 
Mixed: Care intensity was significantly associated 
with two trajectory groups, but in different 
directions, and the parameter estimate was very 
close to 0 in both cases. 
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Chapter 5. Discussion 
Any analysis of the economic impacts of caregiving comes with challenges. A number of 
decisions were made in the course of this analysis, with the goal of creating models that were 
both testable and parsimonious. However, most decisions require trade-offs. Therefore, a few 
limitations to this study, both conceptual and methodological, should be noted. 
Limitations 
One conceptual limitation is related to the choice of wealth instead of income as the 
dependent variable of interest. As several cross-sectional studies have suggested (AARP, 2012), 
caregiving may have substantial direct impacts on the income of caregivers who were working 
full-time before they assumed the caregiving role. It may be that for some caregivers, especially 
those in lower income brackets, the decreases in income do not directly result in decreased 
wealth, because income is not used heavily for savings. There may be some impact from 
decreases in Social Security contributions, but since contributions to Social Security are not 
included in the wealth measures in the HRS, the impact of decreased Social Security 
contributions on retirement preparation does not emerge in this study. Income trajectories present 
their own challenges, since income may fluctuate significantly from month to month and year to 
year, and may not, therefore, follow a statistically perceptible trajectory. Also, in the age range of 
interest in this study, some respondents may choose to retire for reasons other than caregiving, 
and teasing out the effects of caregiving on income in the presence of both “normal” and 
caregiving-motivated retirement presents some interesting challenges. Nonetheless, choosing to 
focus on wealth may have resulted in leaving some of the negative impacts of caregiving 
undetected, especially among lower-income respondents.  
 84
A related issue is that differences in income status may impact differences in the balance 
of informal and formal care provided to the care recipient. For instance, some low-income care 
recipients may qualify for Medicaid services, and some high-income care recipients may be able 
to pay for home care on their own. As a result, the demand for caregivers’ time may be highest 
among families in the middle – and therefore these caregivers may feel the most physical, 
emotional, and financial strain. On the other hand, some evidence suggests that even when 
formal services are provided to LTC recipients, either as private pay or with public assistance, 
the amount of time spent on informal care remains constant or decreases very slightly (Pezzin, 
Kemper, & Reschovky, 1996). Although the impact on caregivers’ expenses is not certain, it may 
be that informal care expenses, similar to informal care time, are relatively invariant even when 
formal services are provided through public funds. The question of whether the presence of 
formal care services mitigates the financial impact of caregiving is not addressed in the present 
study, but is an important area for future investigation. 
Another conceptual consideration is that this dataset is limited to adults over the age of 
50, which limits generalizability of the study because the median age of caregivers in the U.S. is 
roughly 49. It may be that younger caregivers experience different economic impacts from 
caregiving, especially because they may have more earning years ahead of them, but they also 
may be more likely to be “sandwiched” caregivers, who are providing care for both a parent and 
a child or children. The HRS is uniquely suited to this type of longitudinal analysis of household 
wealth because of the number of waves of data and the length of participation by respondents, 
but it limits generalizability to caregivers who are over age 50. A related limitation is the 
restriction of analysis to those providing care for a parent. Many caregivers in this age range 
provide care for a spouse; analysis of their finances is more difficult, however, because income 
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and wealth are measured at the household level and may include income and wealth of the care 
recipient as a result. Therefore, this study limits analysis to caregivers for parents, with the 
understanding that generalizability is limited as a result.  
The method of measuring caregiving also presents a limitation in this dataset. First, the 
measure captures all who have provided 100 hours or more of care for a parent over the last two 
years; this may include those who only provided two hours of care per week for an entire year, as 
well as those who were full-time caregivers for only a few weeks. The measure of intensity 
attempts to capture some of this nuance; however, models that use the caregiver status measure 
or the duration measure may dilute some of the effects of caregiving on assets because they may 
include those who have not been caregivers for very long, or who have not had a very intense 
caregiving experience. A related issue is that the caregiving measures ask only about care 
provided to a parent or stepparent, not care provided to a parent-in-law. This may miss some 
important impacts of caregiving for those who are not caring for their own parents, but are caring 
for their spouse/partner’s parent. Interestingly, caregiving for parents-in-law is measured in 1998 
and 2000, but not in subsequent waves. As a result, these data are excluded from this study, but 
may have indirect impacts. In 1998, there were 455 people who were providing ADL and/or 
IADL care for a parent-in-law, but not for their own parents. These caregivers were included in 
the original sample of non-caregivers because they do not fit the narrow definition of caregiving 
used here; however, they may have been experiencing impacts on assets from their caregiving 
experience, and so they may have a small but confounding effect on the models. Similarly, there 
may be respondents in other waves who are caregivers for parents-in-law, and who may have 
lower asset totals as a result, thereby confounding these findings and potentially creating a type 
II error. 
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There is also an important methodological limitation to note: because of the wide range 
of net worth values and the continuous distribution of net worth values across the population, 
there is a great deal of heterogeneity in both starting values for wealth and trajectory shapes. The 
group-based growth curve approach imposes a homogeneity assumption on the intercepts of each 
group, meaning that it assumes that the starting values for the trajectories will be roughly the 
same within groups, while differing between groups. Applying this assumption frees enough 
parameters to be able to test cubic terms in the trajectories, but it causes some difficulty in 
assessing model fit, as is discussed above. Despite this limitation, the method was chosen 
because it allows for analysis of the cubic terms of the trajectories; nonetheless, future work 
should test these models using an approach that frees the intercepts within groups to determine 
whether probability of group membership is affected by the equality constraints.  
Lastly, a number of measures used in this study, including the caregiving status measure, 
are only measured every two years; therefore, some nuances of the caregiving experience may be 
lost in this analysis. Similarly, some measures, such as marital status, had to be recoded into 
dichotomous variables in order to be included as covariates. As a result, some nuances of the 
respondents’ experiences, such as potential differences in effect of caregiving on those who are 
widowed versus those who were never married, may be missed.  
 
Discussion 
In general, hypotheses about the effect of caregiving on respondents’ assets were 
supported. For most groups, and with most covariates, caregiving status was negatively 
associated with at least one group’s trajectory. The size of the group varied based on the number 
of groups identified in the model, but regardless of the number of groups, caregiving was always 
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significant for at least one. This offers support for the hypothesis that caregiving has a negative 
impact on asset trajectories. At the same time, in every model, caregiving was only significantly 
associated with a small group. Size of the group varied from 10% to under 3%, depending on the 
number of groups identified. This suggests that while it is an important factor for some, for a 
majority of people, caring for a parent does not have a significant impact on wealth over time.  
Findings about the role of caregiver characteristics – specifically, race and health – are 
generally consistent with the literature. Being single, African-American or Hispanic, and having 
a high school education or less were all associated with membership in the group for whom 
caregiving had a negative impact on wealth, suggesting that members of already vulnerable 
groups are more likely to experience negative impacts from caregiving over time. Being in poor 
health was negatively and significantly associated with wealth trajectories for most groups, 
suggesting that it has an important impact on wealth regardless of other factors. It is notable that 
the effect remains present for the group that is negatively impacted by the caregiving experience, 
since caregivers are more likely to experience poor health than noncaregivers. This suggests that 
while poor health does not completely explain the negative impact of caregiving on wealth 
trajectories, it may compound the effect.  
The findings on gender are not consistent with the larger body of literature on the gender 
gap in wealth. In the models presented here, gender is only statistically significant for one small 
group (2.7%) in the five-group model, and is not statistically significant for any groups in other 
models. The findings do not directly refute other studies, however, because the models only 
compare likelihoods of belonging to one wealth trajectory group versus another; they do not 
directly compare wealth trajectories of women versus those of men. It may be that the gender 
effects are consistent across models, and thus, that no one group is distinguished from the others 
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in terms of membership of females. Dividing wealth by the number of people in the household 
may dilute some of the gender effects if women who are married or partnered have more wealth 
than those who were not part of a couple. Lastly, some of the gender gap may be accounted for 
by the significance of the caregiving status variable, since a majority of caregivers in this sample 
are women.  
It is also important to note that when marital status is added to the model without other 
covariates, the negative effects of caregiving disappear. This indicates that marital status may 
have special importance in understanding potential long-term economic impacts of caregiving. In 
particular, since women who are widowed are more likely to live in poverty, and women in 
general are more likely to be caregivers, more analysis is needed to understand whether there is 
an interaction between marital status and caregiving in relation to long-term wealth trajectories. 
These relationships were not fully explored in this study, because those who were divorced, 
widowed, and single were combined into one category. Future work should focus more directly 
on the interactions of gender, marital status, and caregiving status and their potential cumulative 
impacts on assets. 
 
Implications  
Although conclusions from this study must be drawn with caution, the consistency of the 
findings across models offers support for the hypothesis that providing care for an aging parent 
has negative impacts on some wealth trajectories; however, the findings are clear that caregiving 
only has negative impacts for a small group. Further, the findings support the hypotheses that 
unmarried people, ethnic/racial minority populations, and people in poor health are most 
vulnerable to these impacts. These dynamics are important to acknowledge, especially as our 
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country’s LTC system continues to increase its reliance on informal caregivers to provide not 
just occasional care, but also assistance with ADLs and complex medical tasks. This study 
suggests that while a majority of people providing care to an aging parent may not experience 
long-term impacts on their wealth, a minority may have lower wealth trajectories as a result of 
their caregiving experience – and this negative impact may compound existing vulnerabilities to 
financial insecurity. In short, some caregivers may need additional financial support, either 
during the caregiving experience, or later in life when their savings come up short as they face 
their own retirement and LTC needs.  
These findings are particularly important at this point in the ongoing policy conversation 
about long-term care coverage in the U.S. In fact, very recently, the 112th Congress repealed the 
CLASS Act as part of the American Taxpayer Relief Act (Pub. L. 112-240). Advocates had 
viewed CLASS as a promising first attempt to enact a national, long-term care insurance 
program (Advance CLASS, 2013). The CLASS program had been written into the Affordable 
Care Act in 2010, but implementation of the program had been scrapped by the HHS in 2012 
because the statutory requirements of the program, as written by Congress, made the program 
very unlikely to remain viable. Congress moved to repeal the Act rather than making the 
legislative changes necessary to facilitate implementation, but in exchange, a new Commission 
on Long-Term Care was created. This Commission is likely to return a report similar to its 1990 
counterpart, the Pepper Commission, since the facts surrounding our country’s long-term care 
system remain largely the same, with the exception that more is known now about the impact of 
informal caregiving on families.  
The present study offers partial confirmation and partial challenge to the findings of 
cross-sectional studies on the impact of caregiving on caregivers’ finances. When examined 
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longitudinally, it appears that caregiving for an aging parent does not always negatively impact 
caregivers’ wealth trajectories; importantly, however, it does negatively impact some – and 
especially those who are already vulnerable to financial insecurity. Policymakers continue to be 
concerned about the increase in demand on public programs such as Medicaid and Social 
Security’s Supplemental Security Income (SSI), and yet increasing reliance on informal 
caregivers may, inadvertently, increase the number of people who will need these programs later 
because they lost opportunities to save for their own retirement and LTC needs while serving as 
caregivers. As the new Commission on Long-Term Care gets to work, the hope is that this new 
information about the long-term financial impacts of caregiving will influence decisions about 
how to support vulnerable caregivers as they perform a service that is valuable to society and 
critical to the long-term care system as it is currently structured.  
The study also offers an important methodological contribution to the study of the 
economic impacts of caregiving. Previous work has focused mostly on cross-sectional analysis 
and has not always used nationally representative samples. Applying latent growth curve 
analysis to wealth data and using 10 years’ of data to begin to explore the long-term effects of 
caregiving are important innovations – and yield the interesting finding that the impacts of 
caregiving for an aging parent are far more complex than previous research has indicated.  
 
Directions for Future Research 
This study fills an important gap in our knowledge about the economic impacts of 
informal caregiving, but there is more work to be done. In fact, several looming questions 
emerge from the findings. First, since wealth accumulation is a life-long process, even a study 
that examines 10 years of data is inadequate to fully document wealth trajectories across the life 
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course. Because questions about caregiving were inconsistent in the HRS until 1998, the length 
of time included in this analysis was necessarily limited; as future waves of data are collected 
however, it may be possible to build an even clearer picture of the natural patterns of wealth 
development through the later half of life among HRS respondents. Additionally, it may be that 
other data sets, which include younger respondents, may provide opportunities to track 
trajectories across the entire life course, and thereby to put the impacts of caregiving into a more 
complete context.  
Second, this study explores the economic impact of caregiving specifically on informal 
caregivers who provide care for a parent. Research is needed to understand the impacts of 
caregiving on those who care for a spouse, in particular because widows are particularly 
vulnerable to poverty in general. It may be that those who are widowed after an extended 
caregiving experience may be even more vulnerable and in need of extra financial support.  
Third, more work is needed to understand the impact of caregiving on income trajectories 
and on household spending. Some of the caregivers in this sample had very low income, and low 
or negative net worth, and for these respondents, impacts on income may not have translated into 
lower wealth trajectories. Rather, caregiving may have impacts by limiting the amount of money 
available to these caregivers for their own household expenses. Thus, further study of the impact 
of caregiving on income across the population is needed, especially because impacts on income 
may have direct impacts on Social Security contributions. Since Social Security is the primary 
source of retirement income for an increasing number of older adults, any decrease in Social 
Security savings could have long-term negative consequences. Additionally, future analysis 
should include exploration of how household spending differs among caregivers and non-
caregivers. 
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Lastly, future work is needed to explore the intersectionality of caregiving with the race 
and gender gaps in both income and wealth. This study suggests that race may be a risk factor for 
negative impacts of caregiving on wealth, but the findings on gender are less clear. Further study 
of these interactions is needed. Women and people of color are more likely to have low incomes 
and low wealth, and so the impacts of caregiving may not be completely captured by this study. 
Future research should examine the impacts of caregiving on income, especially among women 
and people of color. 
 
Conclusion 
Over the last decade, a significant shift in LTC service delivery has prioritized 
community care over institutionalization. This shift is popular with care recipients and state 
policy makers, but is placing increasing pressure on families who are tasked with increasingly 
complex care responsibilities. This study lends support to those who are concerned that 
providing informal care – in this case, to an aging parent – may have negative impacts on some 
caregivers, not just in terms of the physical and emotional toll, but also by placing them at 
greater risk for financial insecurity by lowering their ability to accumulate wealth over time. 
Although most caregivers will not experience sustained negative financial impacts, some 
caregivers are particularly vulnerable. Social workers and policy makers should remember that 
unpaid care is not necessarily free, and that special attention to vulnerable caregivers should 
include consideration of their household financial situation. 
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Appendix A. Model statistics for alternate models tested 
Hypothesis 2.1: Female caregivers will experience greater negative change in wealth 
trajectories over time than men. 
Table 20. 3-group model with gender as covariate. 
 Parameter β S.E. p 
Group 1 (89.70%) Intercept 5.83 1.13 0.0000 
 Linear 0.02 0.01 0.1191 
 Caregiving (Yes=1) -0.01 0.04 0.8104 
 Respondent in wave 
(Yes=1) 
-0.70 0.49 0.1532 
 Parent living (Yes=1) -0.08 0.03 0.0280 
     
Group 2 (3.90%) Intercept -4.99 110.49 0.9639 
 Linear 13.94 1.16 0.0000** 
 Quadratic -3.45 0.38 0.0000** 
 Cubic 0.27 0.04 0.0000** 
 Caregiving (Yes=1) 0.21 0.54 0.7038 
 Respondent in wave 
(Yes=1) 
-9.32 109.57 0.9322 
 Parent living (Yes=1) 0.31 0.44 0.4789 
 Gender (Female=1) -0.30 0.25 0.2288 
     
Group 3 (6.40%) Intercept 13.56 0.88 0.0000 
 Linear -1.57 0.58 0.0070 
 Quadratic 0.18 0.09 0.0436 
 Caregiving (Yes=1) -1.84 0.56 0.0011** 
 Respondent in wave 
(Yes=1) 
-9.93 1.85 0.0000** 
 Parent living (Yes=1) -0.20 0.81 0.8009 
 Gender (Female=1) 0.33 0.20 0.1020 
     
 Sigma (variance 
explained by model) 
1.23 0.04 0.0000** 
BIC=-22203.56 (N=3092) 
Table 21. 5-group model with gender as covariate.  
 Parameter β S.E. p 
Group 1 (3.5%) Intercept -5.61 156.11 0.9713 
 Linear 15.62 1.22 0.0000** 
 Quadratic -3.98 0.38 0.0000** 
 Cubic 0.32 0.03 0.0000** 
 Caregiving  -0.41 0.50 0.4104 
 Respondent in wave  -9.03 155.21 0.9536 
 Parent living  -0.31 0.28 0.2630 
     
Group 2 (2.7%) Intercept 0.77 1066.70 0.9994 
 Linear 0.11 0.18 0.5371 
 Caregiving  -1.76 0.75 0.0183* 
 Respondent in wave  -1.39 1066.80 0.9990 
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 Parent living  -0.74 0.95 0.4328 
 Gender  1.18 0.41 0.0042** 
     
Group 3 (87.4%) Intercept 4.85 12.11 0.6891 
 Linear 0.08 0.02 0.0000** 
 Quadratic -0.01 0.00 0.0217** 
 Caregiving  -0.00 0.03 0.8869 
 Respondent in wave  0.18 12.11 0.9878 
 Parent living  -0.02 0.02 0.3512 
 Gender  0.44 0.25 0.0810* 
     
Group 4 (2.7%) Intercept 10.78 1386.41 0.9938 
 Linear -14.84 4.29 0.0005** 
 Quadratic 5.13 1.44 0.0004** 
 Cubic -0.52 0.14 0.0001** 
 Caregiving -1.78 1.80 0.3496 
 Respondent in wave  4.87 1383.25 0.9972 
 Parent living  -1.62 0.90 0.0711* 
 Gender  0.53 0.38 0.1687 
     
Group 5 (3.7%) Intercept 2.34 4556.91 0.9996 
 Linear 5.78 2.26 0.0106** 
 Quadratic -2.64 0.81 0.0011** 
 Cubic 0.30 0.08 0.0002** 
 Caregiving  -0.65 0.58 0.2618 
 Respondent in wave  -4.82 4558.39 0.9992 
 Parent living  2.88 1.28 0.0240** 
 Gender  0.53 0.38 0.1687 
     
 Sigma  1.08 0.03 0.0000 
BIC = -20957.12 (N = 3092) 
Hypothesis 2.2: Race/ethnicity will significantly predict membership in groups for whom 
caregiving significantly and negatively impacts wealth trajectories. 
Table 22. 3-group model with race as covariate. 
 Parameter β S.E. p 
Group 1 (89.5%) Intercept 5.80 1.24 0.0000 
 Linear 0.07 0.02 0.0009** 
 Quadratic -0.01 0.00 0.0458** 
 Caregiving  -0.02 0.04 0.6720 
 Respondent in wave  -0.74 1.22 0.5465 
 Parent living  -0.07 0.03 0.0212** 
     
Group 2 (6.7%) Intercept 3.21 30.50 0.9162 
 Linear -1.55 0.54 0.0038** 
 Quadratic 0.18 0.08 0.0290** 
 Caregiving  -1.87 0.53 0.0038** 
 Respondent in wave  0.42 24.82 0.9864 
 Parent living  -0.20 0.72 0.7807 
 Race (White/Non- -1.78 0.19 0.0000** 
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Hispanic=1) 
     
Group 3 (3.8%) Intercept -4.92 87.23 0.9550 
 Linear 14.09 1.16 0.0000** 
 Quadratic -3.48 0.37 0.0000** 
 Cubic 0.28 0.04 0.0000** 
 Caregiving  0.21 0.55 0.7034 
 Respondent in wave  -9.58 86.75 0.9120 
 Parent living  0.31 0.45 0.4903 
 Race (White/Non-
Hispanic=1) 
-0.84 0.28 0.0025** 
     
 Sigma 1.23 0.04 0.0000 
BIC = -22142.44 (N=3092) 
Table 23. 5-group model with race as covariate.  
 Parameter β S.E. p 
Group 1 (3.5%) Intercept -5.63 46.89 0.9044 
 Linear 15.64 1.22 0.0000** 
 Quadratic -3.99 0.38 0.0000** 
 Cubic 0.32 0.03 0.0000** 
 Caregiving  -0.33 0.45 0.4617 
 Respondent in wave  -9.04 46.49 0.8458 
 Parent living  -0.30 0.27 0.2702 
     
Group 2 (2.7%) Intercept 0.66 158.82 0.9967 
 Linear 0.09 0.16 0.5718 
 Caregiving  -1.38 0.59 0.0193** 
 Respondent in wave  -1.50 158.51 0.9924 
 Parent living  -0.47 1.05 0.6522 
 Race  -1.22 0.40 0.0024** 
     
Group 3 (87.1%) Intercept 4.85 24.55 0.8435 
 Linear 0.08 0.02 0.0000** 
 Quadratic -0.01 0.00 0.0178** 
 Caregiving  -0.00 0.03 0.9274 
 Respondent in wave  0.19 24.57 0.9940 
 Parent living  -0.02 0.02 0.5081 
 Race  0.87 0.30 0.0037** 
     
Group 4 (3.6%) Intercept 10.75 1721.18 0.9950 
 Linear -13.39 2.18 0.0000** 
 Quadratic 4.34 0.75 0.0000** 
 Cubic -0.42 0.08 0.0000** 
 Caregiving  -0.50 1.61 0.7547 
 Respondent in wave  4.84 1722.94 0.9978 
  Parent living  -2.32 0.69 0.0008** 
 Race  -0.52 0.44 0.2403 
     
Group 5 (3.2%) Intercept 0.62 398.84 0.9988 
 Linear 8.98 1.45 0.0000** 
 Quadratic -3.67 0.56 0.0000** 
 Cubic 0.39 0.06 0.0000** 
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 Caregiving  -0.47 0.61 0.4348 
 Respondent in wave  -6.54 399.37 0.9869 
 Parent living  4.01 0.89 0.0000** 
 Race  -0.62 0.47 0.1911 
     
 Sigma  1.08 0.03 0.0000** 
BIC = -20865.86 (N = 3092) 
Hypothesis 2.3: Education will significantly predict membership in groups for whom 
caregiving significantly and negatively impacts wealth trajectories.
Table 24. 3-group model with education as covariate. 
 Parameter β S.E. p 
Group 1 (89.6%) Intercept 5.80 0.86 0.0000 
 Linear 0.07 0.02 0.0010** 
 Quadratic -0.01 0.00 0.0493** 
 Caregiving  -0.01 0.04 0.7392 
 Respondent in wave  -0.74 0.89 0.4100 
 Parent living  -0.07 0.03 0.0372 
     
Group 2 (6.6%) Intercept 3.20 2.81 0.2556 
 Linear -1.52 0.54 0.0048** 
 Quadratic 0.17 0.08 0.0362** 
 Caregiving  -1.83 0.57 0.0014** 
 Respondent in wave  0.41 2.35 0.8614 
 Parent living  -0.20 0.75 0.7877 
 Education    
     
Group 3 (3.8%) Intercept -4.89 120.58 0.9677 
 Linear 14.03 1.15 0.0000** 
 Quadratic -3.47 0.38 0.0000** 
 Cubic 0.28 0.04 0.0000** 
 Caregiving  0.21 0.55 0.7019 
 Respondent in wave  -9.55 119.97 0.9366 
 Parent living  0.30 0.45 0.4966 
 Education    
     
 Sigma 1.23 0.04 0.0000 
BIC -22188.56 (N=3092) 
Table 25. 5-group model with education as covariate.  
 Parameter β S.E. p 
Group 1 (3.5%) Intercept -5.62 148.80 0.9699 
 Linear 15.63 1.22 0.0000** 
 Quadratic -3.98 0.38 0.0000** 
 Cubic 0.32 0.03 0.0000** 
 Caregiving  -0.43 0.50 0.3873 
 Respondent in wave  -9.03 147.91 0.9513 
 Parent living  -0.31 0.27 0.2479 
 Education    
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Group 2 (2.8%) Intercept 0.78 248.34 0.9975 
 Linear 0.12 0.17 0.4971 
 Caregiving  -1.84 0.82 0.0249** 
 Respondent in wave  -1.38 248.39 0.9956 
 Parent living  -0.78 0.85 0.3570 
 Education -0.94 0.41 0.0222** 
     
Group 3 (87.3%) Intercept 4.85 109.21 0.9646 
 Linear 0.08 0.02 0.0000** 
 Quadratic -0.01 0.00 0.0137** 
 Caregiving  -0.01 0.03 0.8499 
 Respondent in wave  0.19 109.21 0.9986 
 Parent living  -0.02 0.02 0.3186 
 Education 0.41 0.26 0.1197 
     
Group 4 (2.7%) Intercept 10.79 6279.82 0.9986 
 Linear -14.82 4.45 0.0009** 
 Quadratic -0.01 0.00 0.0137** 
 Cubic -0.52 0.14 0.0002** 
 Caregiving  -1.82 1.62 0.2633 
 Respondent in wave  4.88 6283.50 0.9994 
 Parent living  -1.65 0.84 0.0501* 
 Education 0.11 0.53 0.8395 
     
Group 5 (3.8%) Intercept 2.42 3115.66 0.9994 
 Linear 5.61 1.98 0.0046** 
 Quadratic -2.57 0.71 0.0003** 
 Cubic 0.29 0.07 0.0000** 
 Caregiving  -0.69 0.53 0.1910 
 Respondent in wave  -4.74 3114.32 0.9988 
 Parent living  2.83 1.20 0.0182** 
 Education -0.41 0.40 0.3002 
     
 Sigma  1.08 0.03 0.0000 
BIC = -20939.56 (N = 3092) 
Hypothesis 2.4: Caregivers’ health will be significantly and negatively associated with 
wealth trajectories in groups for whom caregiving is also significantly and negatively 
associated. 
Table 26. 3-group model with health as covariate. 
 Parameter β S.E. p 
Group 1 (3.71%) Intercept -5.41 26.15 0.8360 
 Linear 13.50 1.26 0.0000** 
 Quadratic -3.26 0.42 0.0000** 
 Cubic 0.26 0.04 0.0000** 
 Caregiving  0.14 0.69 0.8411 
 Health (Excellent=1; 
Poor=5) 
-0.35 0.11 0.0019** 
 Respondent in wave  -8.20 26.08 0.7532 
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 Parent living  0.66 0.57 0.2406 
     
Group 2 (89.24%) Intercept 5.09 11.99 0.6712 
 Linear 0.08 0.02 0.0001** 
 Quadratic -0.01 0.00 0.0208** 
 Caregiving  0.01 0.04 0.7886 
 Health (Excellent=1; 
Poor=5) 
-0.19 0.01 0.0000** 
 Respondent in wave  0.43 16.86 0.9798 
 Parent living  -0.07 0.03 0.0065** 
     
Group 3 (7.05%) Intercept 6.21 7.07 0.3798 
 Linear -1.65 0.42 0.0001** 
 Quadratic 0.20 0.42 0.0027** 
 Caregiving  -2.00 0.62 0.0009** 
 Health (Excellent=1; 
Poor=5) 
-0.53 0.15 0.0003** 
 Respondent in wave  -0.33 7.02 0.9624 
 Parent living  -0.43 0.60 0.4711 
     
 Sigma 1.21 0.04 0.0000** 
BIC = -21972.37 (N=3092) 
Table 27. 5-group model with health as covariate.  
 Parameter β S.E. p 
Group 1 (2.15%) Intercept 0.43 0.00 0.9967 
 Linear 0.39 2.62 0.0088 ** 
 Caregiving  -2.54 -4.11 0.0000 ** 
 Health  -0.30 -1.69 0.0903 * 
 Respondent in wave  -1.73 -0.02 0.9881 
 Parent living  0.39 0.55 0.5845 
     
Group 2 (3.31%) Intercept -5.36 32.61 0.8694 
 Linear 15.44 1.21 0.0000 ** 
 Quadratic -3.87 0.39 0.0000 ** 
 Cubic 0.31 0.04 0.0000 ** 
 Caregiving  -0.49 0.45 0.2832 
 Health  -0.20 0.11 0.0804 * 
 Respondent in wave  -8.77 32.00 0.7840 
 Parent living  -0.44 0.25 0.0794 * 
     
Group 3 (4.16%) Intercept 2.88 52.42 0.9562 
 Linear -1.17 0.40 0.0032 ** 
 Quadratic 0.13 0.07 0.0497 ** 
 Caregiving  -0.01 0.62 0.9909 
 Health  -0.38 0.10 0.0001 ** 
 Respondent in wave  -1.78 52.98 0.9732 
 Parent living  5.09 0.71 0.0000 ** 
     
Group 4 (87.10%) Intercept 5.67 20.03 0.9562 
 Linear 0.08 0.01 0.0000 ** 
 Quadratic -0.01 0.00 0.0070 ** 
 Caregiving  -0.03 0.03 0.3132 
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 Health  -0.17 0.01 0.0000 ** 
 Respondent in wave  -0.4 19.80 0.9902 
 Parent living  -0.02 0.02 0.3408 
     
Group 5 (3.28%) Intercept 9.23 4.84 0.0569 
 Linear -2.43 0.65 0.0002 ** 
 Quadratic 0.24 0.10 0.0159 ** 
 Caregiving  -1.31 1.62 0.4238 
 Health  -0.50 0.20 0.0153 ** 
 Respondent in wave  2.06 5.49 0.7071 
 Parent living  -4.54 1.05 0.0000 ** 
     
 Sigma  1.08 0.03 0.0000 ** 
BIC = -20905.44 (N = 3092) 
Hypothesis 2.5: Marital status will significantly predict membership in groups for whom 
caregiving significantly and negatively impacts wealth trajectories. 
Table 28. 3-group model with marital status as covariate. 
 Parameter β S.E. p 
Group 1 (3.70%) Intercept -5.93 585.51 0.9919 
 Linear 13.98 1.28 0.0000** 
 Quadratic -3.41 0.42 0.0000** 
 Cubic 0.27 0.04 0.0000** 
 Caregiving  0.22 0.59 0.7087 
 Marital Status -0.02 0.31 0.9586 
 Respondent in wave  -8.71 584.60 0.9881 
 Parent living  0.42 0.43 0.3285 
     
Group 2 (7.19%) Intercept 3.69 9.13 0.6858 
 Linear -1.61 0.37 0.0000** 
 Quadratic 0.20 0.06 0.0005** 
 Caregiving  -1.15 0.60 0.0545 
 Marital Status 2.13 0.29 0.0000** 
 Respondent in wave  -0.97 8.82 0.9134 
 Parent living  -0.01 0.54 0.9796 
     
Group 3 (89.11%) Intercept 5.69 18.17 0.7543 
 Linear 0.08 0.02 0.0000** 
 Quadratic -0.01 0.00 0.0080** 
 Caregiving  0.01 0.04 0.7150 
 Marital Status 0.28 0.04 0.0000** 
 Respondent in wave  -0.85 18.15 0.9626 
 Parent living  -0.06 0.03 0.0213** 
     
 Sigma 1.21 0.03 0.0000** 
BIC = -21952.55 (N=3092) 
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Table 29. 5-group model with marital status as covariate.  
 Parameter β S.E. p 
Group 1 (2.71%) Intercept 0.54 894.99 0.9995 
 Linear 0.12 0.17 0.4946 
 Caregiving  -1.46 0.53 0.0061** 
 Marital Status 1.08 0.53 0.0428** 
 Respondent in wave  -1.62 894.98 0.9986 
 Parent living  -0.45 0.67 0.5042 
     
Group 2 (3.52%) Intercept -5.49 102.11 0.9571 
 Linear 15.55 1.14 0.0000** 
 Quadratic -3.98 0.34 0.0000** 
 Cubic 0.32 0.03 0.0000** 
 Caregiving -0.38 0.46 0.4108 
 Marital Status -0.20 0.22 0.3464 
 Respondent in wave  -8.91 101.43 0.9300 
 Parent living  -0.34 0.26 0.1972 
     
Group 3 (87.56%) Intercept 4.77 44.11 0.9138 
 Linear 0.07 0.02 0.0000** 
 Quadratic -0.01 0.00 0.0589 
 Caregiving  0.02 0.03 0.5905 
 Marital Status 0.20 0.05 0.0000** 
 Respondent in wave  0.11 44.12 0.9980 
 Parent living  -0.03 0.03 0.3298 
     
Group 4 (3.19%) Intercept 10.56 989.67 0.9915 
 Linear -13.81 3.24 0.0000** 
 Quadratic 4.52 1.18 0.0001** 
 Cubic -0.44 0.12 0.0002** 
 Caregiving  -0.75 1.59 0.6372 
 Marital Status 1.08 0.61 0.0779* 
 Respondent in wave  4.65 991.67 0.9963 
 Parent living  -2.34 0.83 0.0047** 
     
Group 5 (3.01%) Intercept 0.57 28.36 0.9841 
 Linear 8.34 1.33 0.0000** 
 Quadratic -3.47 0.47 0.0000** 
 Cubic 0.37 0.05 0.0000** 
 Caregiving  -0.68 0.46 0.1357 
 Marital Status 0.69 0.27 0.0114** 
 Respondent in wave  -6.60 29.84 0.8251 
 Parent living  4.32 1.25 0.0006** 
     
 Sigma  1.07 0.03 0.0000 
BIC = -20862.60 (N = 3092) 
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Hypothesis 3.1: Duration of the informal caregiving experience is associated with a larger 
depressing effect on caregivers’ wealth trajectories over time. 
Table 30. 3-group model with care duration as covariate. 
 Parameter β S.E. p 
Group 1 (2.95%) Intercept 0.03 0.50 0.9523 
 Linear -0.58 0.20 0.0037** 
 Care duration  0.64 0.51 0.2144 
 Parent living 0.25 0.67 0.7081 
     
Group 2 (9.91%) Intercept 3.89 0.90 0.0000** 
 Linear -0.33 0.21 0.1292 
 Care duration -0.15 0.43 0.7237 
 Parent living  -0.09 0.59 0.8739 
     
Group 3 (87.14%) Intercept 5.03 0.07 0.0000** 
 Linear 0.04 0.01 0.0022** 
 Care duration 0.05 0.03 0.0836* 
 Parent living  -0.01 0.04 0.8724 
     
 Sigma 1.28 0.07 0.0000** 
BIC = -30459.38 (N=869) 
Hypothesis 3.2: Intensity of the informal caregiving experience is associated with a larger 
depressing effect on caregivers’ wealth trajectories over time. 
Table 31. 3-group model with care intensity as covariate. 
 Parameter β S.E. p 
Group 1 (4.75%) Intercept 3.12 1.20 0.0096** 
 Linear -1.68 0.27 0.0000** 
 Care Hours  0.00 0.00 0.0000** 
 Parent living -0.57 0.94 0.5473 
     
Group 2 (91.37%) Intercept 5.08 0.06 0.0000** 
 Linear 0.05 0.01 0.0005** 
 Care Hours -0.00 0.00 0.2620 
 Parent living  -0.05 0.05 0.2710 
     
Group 3 (3.88%) Intercept 0.38 0.81 0.6350 
 Linear 1.11 0.39 0.0049** 
 Care Hours -0.00 0.00 0.0000** 
 Parent living  -0.86 1.23 0.4841 
     
 Sigma 1.08 0.06 0.0000** 
BIC = -12304.01 (N=869) 
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Table 32. 5-group model with care intensity as covariate.  
 Parameter β S.E. p 
Group 1 (3.43%) Intercept 14.03 5.64 0.0130** 
 Linear -13.70 6.23 0.0280** 
 Quadratic 3.11 1.97 0.1148 
 Cubic -0.19 0.18 0.3067 
 Care hours 0.00 0.00 0.0037** 
 Parent living -1.10 0.89 0.2181 
     
Group 2 (3.00%) Intercept -12.52 3.54 0.0004** 
 Linear 13.97 3.86 0.0003** 
 Quadratic -3.50 1.29 0.0066** 
 Cubic 0.28 0.13 0.0583* 
 Care hours 0.00 0.00 0.6298 
 Parent living  -0.74 0.99 0.4545 
     
Group 3 (89.28%) Intercept 5.05 0.08 0.0000** 
 Linear 0.09 0.05 0.0635 
 Quadratic -0.01 0.00 0.2501 
 Care hours -0.00 0.00 0.2501 
 Parent living  -0.04 0.05 0.4432 
     
Group 4 (3.22%) Intercept -0.55 0.30 0.0659* 
 Linear 8.47 1.45 0.0000** 
 Quadratic -2.61 0.52 0.0000** 
 Cubic 0.22 0.05 0.0000** 
 Care hours -0.00 0.00 0.0011** 
 Parent living  -1.42 0.62 0.0217** 
     
Group 5 (1.07%) Intercept 25.65 0.96 0.0000** 
 Linear -19.27 0.78 0.0000** 
 Quadratic 3.87 0.18 0.0000** 
 Care hours -0.00 0.00 0.0000** 
 Parent living  -6.10 0.34 0.0000** 
     
 Sigma  0.86 0.04 0.0000** 
BIC = -10885.67 (N = 869) 
 
